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1CHAPTER 1 HOUSING WEALTH, FINANCIAL WEALTH, AND
HEALTHCARE SPENDING
1.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the impacts of housing and financial wealth on healthcare
spending using the matched household data constructed from the Consumer Expenditure
Survey (CES) and the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The human capital model of
demand for health (Grossman, 1972, 2000) suggests that wealth has a positive effect on
healthcare spending as higher wealth will relax the budget constraint of individuals and
allows individuals to consumer more healthcare, ceteris paribus (Kim and Ruhm, 2012).1
This implies that prior studies which use only income as a proxy for economic resources
do not provide a complete picture of how resources affect healthcare spending (Goodman,
1989). Additionally, the exclusion of wealth raises the concern of endogeneity2 (Feinstein,
1993). Furthermore, literature in macroeconomics and finance indicates that wealth
effect might differ depending upon the forms of wealth, for example, housing wealth and
financial wealth, because of difference in features such as uncertainty of shocks, liquidity,
tax treatment, and mental accounting by households with respect to the forms of wealth
they hold (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005; Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009; Belsky,
2010). However, in what direction the housing wealth effect differs from the financial
wealth effect is an empirical issue.
Data problems aside, studies focusing on effects of housing and financial wealth on
healthcare spending need to take into account a large fraction of zero values in health-
care spending. In this paper, I address this issue by using dependent double-hurdle model
1Anecdotal evidence in the media also indicates that households reduce healthcare spending following
the loss of income and wealth (Lowrey, 2013).
2 Feinstein (1993) states “...the problem of reverse causality is less likely to aﬄict household wealth than
household income measures, primarily because wealth accumulates over time and hence is less affected
by a single episode of sickness”.
2(Jones, 1989; Okunade, Suraratdecha, and Benson, 2010). The double-hurdle model per-
mits the possibilities that healthcare spending might be zero, first, because households
decide not to participate in healthcare spending and second, because households decide to
participate in healthcare spending but may not be able to afford the spending at current
price, income, and wealth. I begin the empirical analysis by estimating the model for
pooled sample (1989-2010) using gross measure of household wealth. The results indicate
significant housing and financial wealth and relatively large housing wealth effect. Next,
I estimate the model separately by survey years of the SCF to examine how housing and
financial wealth effects have changed over time. The data suggest that housing wealth
effects are significant for all years and relatively large, but financial wealth effects are
insignificant in most cases. Analysis by SCF survey years also reveals the diminished
housing wealth effect but increased financial wealth effect following the Great Recession
when compared to the survey year of the SCF before the Great Recession. In addition,
subgroup analyses by age group and credit-constrained show that the housing wealth ef-
fect is most pronounced among older aged households and credit-constrained households,
whereas the financial wealth effect is significant only for older aged households and un-
constrained households. In general, the results are qualitatively similar when I use net
wealth measure. However, housing and financial wealth effects using net wealth specifi-
cation are smaller in magnitudes compared to those using gross wealth specification. In
other words, households are less sensitive to net wealth measure than to gross wealth
measure. 3
The contribution of the paper to the health economics literature can be summarized
as follows. First, it provides an empirical examination of relationship between healthcare
3These findings are consistent with the behavioral theory that argue that households form “mental
accounts” that make them more likely to consume assets held in some ways that in others (Poterba,
2000; Thaler, 1990).
3spending and housing and financial wealth. This analysis is relevant as households may
respond differently to fluctuations in housing wealth and financial wealth. In fact, the
paper finds housing wealth effects to be larger than financial wealth effects. Second, it
recognizes the household debt and compares wealth effect of gross measure of housing
wealth or financial wealth with that of net (gross wealth minus debt) measure. Third,
it uses recent data to examine the impacts of housing and financial wealth after Great
Recession. Fourth, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first study to use the CES
to examine the effect of wealth on healthcare spending. Foster (2010) compares the
healthcare spending estimate from the CES with the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey
(MEPS) and find the CES healthcare spending data to be consistent.
Section 1.2 outlines the conceptual framework. Section 1.3 describes the data and
method. Section 1.4 presents the empirical results, and Section 1.5 provides robustness
check and extension. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
This study begins with the human capital model of demand for health (Grossman,
1972, 2000). In the static version of this model, the individuals derive utility from con-
sumption and health, and produce health by combining time inputs with healthcare.
Furthermore, individuals face a single full wealth constraint and maximize the utility
subject to this constraint. Higher wealth will relax the constraint of individuals and
since health is almost certainly a normal good, it will cause individuals to consume more
healthcare, ceteris paribus (Smith, 1999; Kim and Ruhm, 2012). In addition, higher
wealth individuals are more likely to have access to enhanced insurance coverage which
will allow them to purchase more healthcare (Fichera and Gathergood, 2013; Goldman
and Maestas, 2013; Kennickell, 2008).
4Recent studies that examine the effect of wealth on healthcare spending include
Okunade, Suraratdecha, and Benson (2010), Kim and Ruhm (2012), and Lusardi, Schnei-
der, and Tufano (2015). Okunade, Suraratdecha, and Benson (2010), using the Thailand
Socio-Economic Surveys, measure wealth as household ownership of durable goods (e.g.,
air conditioner, motorbike, car, television etc) and find that there is a significant positive
relationship between wealth and out-of-pocket (OOP) spending. Kim and Ruhm (2012)
use an elderly sample from Health and Retirement Survey and document that wealth
shocks associated with inheritances of greater than or equal to $10,000 have positive and
significant impact on expected OOP spending, conditional on positive OOP spending.
Using data on individuals between ages of 18 and 65 from the TNS Global Economic
Crisis Survey (2009), Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2015) find that economic shocks
generated by the economic crisis resulted in relatively large reduction in the use of rou-
tine non-emergency medical care for United States households than those for Canadian,
French, German, and British households. These studies, however, do not differentiate
between the effects of housing and financial wealth on healthcare spending, though the
literature in macroeconomics and finance suggests that they may exist.
The literature in macroeconomics and finance takes a life-cycle consumption model
of consumption as a starting point (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005; Paiella, 2009). The
model suggests that households accumulate and spend their wealth to smooth consump-
tion and that the marginal propensity to consume out of all wealth, irrespective of its
form, should be the same small number (Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005; Paiella, 2009;
Belsky, 2010).4 However, marginal propensity to consume might differ, for example, be-
4The model does not distinguish between different forms of wealth and assumes that households do not
face liquidity constraint (Belsky, 2010). Galama, Hullegie, Meijer, and Outcault (2012) indicate that
consumption smoothing is also applicable to healthcare spending.
5tween housing wealth 5 and stock wealth, for at least four reasons (Case, Quigley, and
Shiller, 2005; Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009; Belsky, 2010). First, households may
view changes in some kinds of wealth as temporary or uncertain (Case, Quigley, and
Shiller, 2005). For example, if households view change in house prices as permanent or
less volatile than change in stock prices then consumption effect associated with housing
wealth will be relatively large (Belsky, 2010). Second, households form mental accounts
that make them more likely to consume wealth held in some ways than in others (Thaler,
1990; Poterba, 2000) .6 Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009) apply this concept to illustrate
the difference in sensitivity of households to gross and net measures of housing wealth
or financial wealth.7 Third, households may find difficult to measure or liquefy certain
form of wealth (Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009; Case, Quigley, and Shiller, 2005). For
example, transaction costs associated with selling or borrowing against stock wealth are
lower than that related with selling or borrowing against housing wealth which suggests
that housing wealth effect will be smaller than stock wealth effect (Bostic, Gabriel, and
Painter, 2009; Belsky, 2010). Fourth, differences in the tax treatment of housing and
stock wealth may result in difference in wealth effects (Belsky, 2010). For example, if
households have a bequest motive and if the housing wealth receives a preferential tax
treatment over stock wealth at bequest, then households may hold housing wealth until
5Theoretically, it is not clear whether there should be a large housing wealth effect. For example, for the
unconstrained homeowner who expects to live in his house for a long time, an increase in house prices
does not make him richer because it also increases the implicit rental cost of housing, and without any
substitution effect (that is change in the housing), it doesnt exert any effect on consumption (Poterba,
2000; Mian and Sufi, 2011; Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Sinai and Souleles, 2005). However, as an asset,
housing can serve as collateral in a loan and thus an increase in house prices increase the homeowner’s
access to “cash on hand” if borrowers are willing to lend against the higher collateral value (Mian and
Sufi, 2011, 2014a). The cash-on-hand effect stimulates the spending , especially for credit constrained
homeowners (Mian and Sufi, 2014a).
6With regard to the stock wealth effect, Poterba (2000) argues that propensity to consume of household
is higher for stocks that are held directly than for stocks that are held in the retirement accounts, since
the later are considered as long term assets.
7Specifically, they argue that households are more sensitive to a dollar windfall capital gain in wealth
(housing or stock) that to the dollar increase in existing wealth.
6death and thus the housing wealth effect may be lower than stock market wealth (Case,
Quigley, and Shiller, 2005; Belsky, 2010).
One may also expect housing wealth effect to differ from the stock market wealth
effect over time for three reasons (Poterba, 2000). First, there have been changes in the
composition of wealth shocks (Poterba, 2000). For example, in the current recession,
both the stock and house prices fell. However, in the 2001 recession, stock prices fell
but that was offset by a rise in house prices. In the 1990-1991 recessions, home values
dropped but that was offset by an increase in stock market wealth (Moore and Palumbo,
2010). The second factor is the increasing share both of households owning equities and of
equities in households total assets relative to housing wealth. Moore and Palumbo (2010)
show that between 1989 and 2007, the share of households owing equities increased by
19 percentage points compared to the 4 percentage points for housing. The third is the
institutional change such as decreasing cost of leaving bequests (Poterba, 2000). McGarry
(2013) notes that US economy has experienced significant changes in both the size of an
estate, that is tax exempt, and in the top marginal rate. For instance, in the late 1980s,
the top marginal estate tax rate was 55 percent and the maximum allowable tax credit
was $0.6 million. This contrasts with the rate of 40 percent and $5.25 million in 2013
(McGarry, 2013; Jacobson, Raub, and Johnson, 2007)8 . The reduction in the estate tax
is more likely to make bequest attractive to high net worth households and thus they
may decrease the current marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (Poterba, 2000).
Recent studies have used panel data and micro data to examine the consumption
effects of housing and stock market wealth. Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) and Case,
Quigley, and Shiller (2013) use a panel of US states and show a stronger housing wealth
8The tax was eliminated in 2010, returned in 2011.
7than stock wealth effect .9 Consistent with Kahneman and Tverskys prospect theory,
Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2013) also show that the housing wealth effect is higher for
the falling market than that for the rising market (elasticity of 0.10 versus 0.032). Similar
to Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005) and Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2013), Calomiris,
Longhofer, and Miles (2013) use a panel of US states and find smaller stock market wealth
effects which they attribute to relatively high volatility of stock wealth and the relatively
lower rate of participation by households in the stock market. They also document that
that consumption effect of housing wealth depends on age composition, poverty rates,
and the housing wealth shares.
Using a unique matched data set constructed from the SCF and the CES, Bostic,
Gabriel, and Painter (2009) find that housing and financial wealth have significant positive
effects on consumption, but housing wealth effects are larger than financial wealth effects.
Guo and Hardin III (2014) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find that
consumption by households with greater share of wealth in financial wealth is not affected
by housing wealth whereas consumption by households with greater share of wealth in
housing wealth is not impacted by financial wealth.
Most of the existing empirical test of wealth effects on consumption, using micro data,
focus on non-durable consumption (Attanasio, Hurst, and Pistaferri, 2012; Attanasio
and Weber, 1995).10 None have tried to empirically identify the impacts of housing and
financial wealth on healthcare spending. Additionally, in what direction housing wealth
effect differs from financial wealth effect is an empirical matter.
9Poterba (2000) argues that the consumption effects of stock market wealth are likely to be small for
most households because of highly skewed distribution of stock ownership.
10The exception is Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter (2009), who report the wealth effects for both total
consumption and durable goods consumption.
81.3 Data and Method
1.3.1 Data
Ideally, one may want to use the survey data that contain detailed information
on wealth and healthcare spending for non-elderly population. Unfortunately, such a
database is not publicly available .11 To overcome this data limitation, I follow Bostic,
Gabriel, and Painter (2009) and use nonparametric statistical matching to combine two
different data sources: the CES and the SCF . 12 Specifically, I obtain household-level
healthcare spending data from the CES and then use the SCF to impute household-
level wealth and its components for households in the CES. In the following subsections,
I briefly describe these data sources and statistical matching process used to combine
these datasets.
Consumer Expenditures Survey
The CES data come from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The data are available
from the start of 1980 to the first quarter of 2012 and consist of two different components:
an interview component and a diary component, each with a different data collection
technique and sample.13 This study employs the interview component of the CES. In
the interview component, each household 14is interviewed five consecutive times, once
11A longitudinal or a cross sectional survey that consists of detailed information on healthcare spending,
health status, and wealth for non-elderly population is presently not available in the US. There exists
the Health and Retirement study, but it focuses only on older population (50 years and above). The
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is a potential data source in this regard; however,
its wealth data are not reliable when compared with the SCF (Czajka, Jacobson, and Cody, 2003).
In addition, the SIPP data have not been subjected to the same, detailed evaluations as the medical
expenditure data from the CES (Foster, 2010) . Moreover, a data gap in the SIPP overlaps with the
Great Recession of 2007-2009 (Hacker et al., 2014).
12See also Salotti (2012).
13The interview component covers up to 95 percent of total expenditures. For details on two different
components, please refer to the Chapter 16 of the BLS (2013).
14A household in the CES is called a consumer unit which is defined as 1) all members of a particular
housing unit who are related by blood, marriage, adoption, or some other legal arrangement, such as
foster children; 2) a person living alone or sharing a household with others, or living as a roomer in a
private home, lodging house, or in permanent living quarters in a hotel or motel, but who is financially
independent; or 3) two or more unrelated persons living together who pool their income to make joint
expenditures decisions. Students living in university-sponsored housing are also included in the sample
9per quarter. The first interview is a contact interview, whereas the second through fifth
interviews collect the spending made by households for three months prior to the month
of interview (Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2009). Households report not
only the healthcare spending, but also the spending on housing, transportation, and
education. The interviews also gather the information on demographic variables and
health insurance status as of the time of interview. In addition, households report the
information about the employment and income for the previous twelve months in the
second and fifth interviews, and information on stock of assets for the previous month and
changes in that stock from the month one year ago, in the fifth interview. The healthcare
spending definition and sample selection criteria are described in Appendix A.1. The
healthcare spending and income variables are converted into 2010 dollar terms using all
items of CPI-U of the BLS. Foster (2010), using the data of 1996-2006, compares the
healthcare spending estimate from the CES with the MEPS and find the CES healthcare
spending data to be consistent. Specifically, he finds CES-MEPS ratio for healthcare
spending to be 0.93.
Survey of Consumer Finances
The study uses the SCF to impute the wealth data into the CES as the coverage
of wealth data in the CES is not reliable (Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009; Kennickell
and Woodburn, 1999). Kennickell and Woodburn (1999) note that the SCF has relatively
good coverage of wealth data compared to other surveys conducted in US.15 The SCF is
conducted every three years by Federal Reserve Board and is available from the start of
1983 to 2010. 16 The SCF employs a dual sampling technique. First, it uses a multistage
as separate consumer units (BLS, 2013).
15See also Czajka, Jacobson, and Cody (2003) for difference in wealth estimates using the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the SCF.
16A household in a SCF is consists of primary economic unit (PEU)— the family—and everyone else
in the household. The PEU is an economically dominant single person or couple (whether married or
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area-probability sample to provide good coverage of broadly distributed variables such as
homeownership and credit card debt (Kennickell, 2008; Kennickell and Woodburn, 1999).
Second, it uses a special sample design (called as a supplemental sample or a list sample)
to include relatively wealthy families disproportionately so as to provide good coverage of
narrowly held variables such as corporate stock (Kennickell and Woodburn, 1999). The
supplemental sample is drawn from a tax list of Internal Revenue Service (Ackerman,
Fries, and Windle, 2012). The SCF handles missing data problem by employing multiple
imputation method. Under this method, which began with the 1989 survey, the SCF
provides five different estimates (called implicates) for each missing data point , resulting
in a total data set with five times the actual number of households. Imputed values differ
across implicates to represent the sampling uncertainty inherent in the imputation. To
account for multiple imputations in the SCF data, the estimation results follow repeated
imputation inference (RII) method of Rubin (1987).
The wealth concept used here includes the gross financial wealth, gross housing wealth,
and gross other real estate wealth (Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009). Gross financial
wealth is defined as sum of: i) liquid assets (checking accounts other than money market
+ savings account+ money market accounts+ call accounts at brokerages) ii) certificates
of deposit iii) mutual funds iv) stocks and bonds (not including bond funds or savings
bonds) v) quasi-liquid retirement accounts (individual retirement accounts, thrift-type
accounts, and future pensions) vi) savings bonds vii) cash value of whole life insurance,
and viii) other managed assets (trusts, annuities and managed investment accounts in
which household has equity interest). Gross housing wealth is the gross value of primary
residence and gross other real estate wealth is the gross value of all residential real estate
living together as partners) and everyone else in the household is financially interdependent with PEU
(Ackerman, Fries, and Windle, 2012).
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other than the primary residence.
The study also incorporates the information on the liabilities in the SCF and compute
net financial wealth, home equity, and other residential real estate equity. Net financial
wealth is the gross financial wealth minus the financial debt17 , home equity is the gross
housing wealth minus mortgages and home equity loans, and other real estate equity is
the gross other real estate wealth minus the mortgages and equity loans. The SCF also
provides the information on demographic characteristics and employment history which
can be used for matching with the CES. The wealth and income variables are expressed
in 2010 dollar terms using all items of CPI-U of the BLS. Although both the CES and
the SCF are available since 1983, I use the data only from 1989 because of changes in the
SCF question frame prior to that year (Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009).
Statistical Matching
For each SCF survey year, I use a nonparametric statistical matching algorithm to
obtain wealth components for CES households.18 The matching process starts with the
harmonization of the two surveys. Harmonization consists of two major phases: (i)
harmonization of population and unit denitions, and (ii) harmonization of denitions of
variables (D’Orazio, Di Zio, and Scanu, 2006). Since the CES and the SCF are both
representative samples of US population, the first phase may not be a problem. The
second phase involves creating new variables using the available information and recoding
some variables. After the harmonization, both CES and SCF samples are partitioned into
cells based on seven categorical variables: race, marital status, education, occupation,
family size, tenure, and health insurance, that are known to be highly-correlated with
17Total debt excluding mortgage debt, other lines of credit and residential debt (i.e. financial debt=
credit card debt + installment debt +other debt).
18Recall that SCF survey years are 1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010.
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variation in the healthcare spending:
(a) Race: white, black, other
(b) Marital status: married/living with partner, other
(c) Education: twelfth grade or less, high school, some college or more
(d) Occupation: unemployed, managers and professional, administrative (administra-
tive support, technical, sales), service, operators (operator, assembler, laborer),
other (precision, production, craft, repairing, farming, forestry, and fishing )
(e) Family size: one, two, three, four or more
(f) Tenure: homeowner, other
(g) Health insurance: insured (private/public), not insured
Partitioning ensures that matches are only allowed for households that agree exactly
on these variables (exact matching). Within each cell, each household in the CES is
matched with the closest SCF household according to a Mahalanobis distance measure19
computed using common variables age and income (D’Orazio, Di Zio, and Scanu, 2006).20
dab = (xa − xb)′
∑
xx
−1
(xa − xb)
where, x include the age and income, and
∑
is the estimated covariance matrix of
x. The distance takes into account the relationship among the x variables .21 When
two or more SCF households are equally distant from a CES household, I choose one of
them at random. I then use wealth components of the SCF household as imputations
for wealth components of the CES household. I also refine the matching by dropping the
CES household whose Mahalanobis distance is greater than 95 percentile. This ensures
19The Mahalanobis distance is suitable when there are relatively few covariates and when the covariates
are normally distributed (Stuart, 2010). These criteria are fulfilled in this study, since I use only age
and logarithm of income, which are more likely to be normally distributed.
20Income, family size, and insurance status are defined at household level. All other variables refer to
the household head.
21In this study, the SCF is considered as the donor and the CES is considered as the recipient.
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that the matched households do not differ significantly across age and income. The match
process yielded 4997 observations in 2010.
The validity of statistical matching is examined using two different ways. First I
examine the correlation between the two measures of income (income in the CES and
income in the SCF)22 and between the income measures and healthcare spending (appears
only in CES) and the wealth variable (appears only in the SCF) for the matched data
corresponding to SCF survey years. The correlation in the Table 1.1 suggests that two
measures of income are highly correlated across SCF survey years. In addition, the
correlation between CES healthcare spending and SCF log income is similar in magnitude
to that of the correlation between CES healthcare spending and CES log income for all
SCF survey years. This relationship is also observed for SCF wealth variables for most
of the survey years, where the CES log income correlations are similar in magnitude to
those of the SCF. Second, I examine the probability density functions of net worth for the
matched and the original SCF datasets (Kum and Masterson, 2010). Figure 1.1 shows
that the probability density functions appear to be identical for the matched and the
original SCF datasets.23
1.3.2 Empirical Model
Healthcare spending studies using the micro data need to take account of two issues:
a) a large proportion of zero observations for healthcare spending and b) right-skewness
for positive observations of healthcare spending. Two-part, sample selection, and hurdle
models have been used to deal with zero observations, whereas logarithmic, Box-Cox, and
inverse hyperbolic sine transformations of healthcare spending have been used to address
the skewness (and non-normality). Following an earlier study on healthcare spending
22The matched dataset consists of both measures of income for each observation.
23Similar correlations and graphs are obtained for other years.
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(Okunade, Suraratdecha, and Benson, 2010), I focus on the use of dependent double-
hurdle model.24
The double-hurdle model, originally proposed by Cragg (1971), assumes that house-
holds must overcome two hurdles before being observed with a positive level of healthcare
spending: first, they have to decide whether or not to participate in healthcare spending
(participation decision) and second, they must decide the level of healthcare spending
(consumption decision).
The rationale for separating the decision processes is (Garcia and Labeaga, 1996):
first, if households decide not to participate in healthcare spending due to noneconomic
reasons (a behavioral zero), economic variables like price, income, and wealth will be
irrelevant for these households and second, if households decide to participate in health-
care spending, then they may choose not to spend for certain levels of economic variables
(corner solution).25
Jones (1989) extends the Cragg’s double-hurdle model by allowing the dependence
in the shocks to participation and consumption decisions. Following Jones (1989), the
double-hurdle model can be written as:
yi =

y∗2i if y
∗
1i  0 and y∗2i  0
0 otherwise
(1.1)
where, yi is the observed healthcare spending and y
∗
1i and y
∗
2i are the latent variables
corresponding to the participation decision and consumption decision, respectively, and
can be expressed as linear functions of explanatory variables, x1i and x2i , respectively.
24The model has also been used in demand analysis for tobacco (e.g. (Jones, 1989)), migrant remittance
(Bettin, Lucchetti, and Zazzaro, 2012), and labor market studies (e.g., (Blundell and Meghir, 1987).
25That is the corner solution of zero consumption is the utility-maximizing choice for these households,
given current prices, income, and wealth (Garcia and Labeaga, 1996; Madden, 2008).Thus, the double-
hurdle model permits the use of different set of determinants in each of the decision stages (Garcia and
Labeaga, 1996).
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y∗1i = x
∗
1iβ1 + u1i
y∗2i = x
∗
2iβ2 + u2i
(1.2)
The error terms u1i and u2i are distributed with a bivariate normal distribution (BVN):
[u1i, u2i] ∼ BVN (0,Σ) and Σ =
 1 σ12
σ12 σ
2

If the sample is divided into those with zero healthcare spending and those with pos-
itive healthcare spending, the likelihood for the double-hurdle model is given by (Jones,
1989, 1992):
L =
n∏
i=1
[1− P (y∗1i  0, y∗2i  0)]1−Ii
n∏
i=1
[P (y∗1i  0, y∗2i  0) f (yi|y∗1i  0, y∗2i  0)]Ii
=
n∏
i=1
[
1−Ψ
(
x′1iβ1,
x′2iβ2
σ
, ρ
)]1−Ii n∏
i=1
[
1
σ
Φ
(
x′1iβ1+
ρ×(yTi −x′2iβ2)
σ
(1−ρ2)1/2
)
φ
(
yTi −x′2iβ2
σ
)]Ii
(1.3)
where, f(yi|., .) is the conditional density function, Ii is a dichotomous variable that
takes a value of 1 if yi  0 , and is 0 otherwise,ρdenotes the correlation coefficient and
is given by ρ = σ12
σ
, φ(.) is the univariate standard normal probability density function,
Φ(.) is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution functions, and Ψ(.) is
the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function. Jones (1989) presents
following three special cases with regard to the dependent double-hurdle model.
(a) Independence:
If u1i and u2i are independent, i.e., ρ = 0 , then the Jones’s double-hurdle model
reduces to Cragg’s double-hurdle model. The likelihood function in this case is:
L =
n∏
i=1
[
1− Φ(x′1iβ1)Φ
(
x′2iβ2
σ
)]1−Ii n∏
i=1
[
1
σ
Φ(x′1iβ1)φ
(
yTi −x′2iβ2
σ
)]Ii
(1.4)
(b) First hurdle dominance: If participation decision dominates the consumption
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decisions, then the Jones’s double-hurdle model reduces to Heckman’s general-
ized Tobit or sample selection model (henceforth referred to as the Heckman’s
model). Dominance implies that the observed zero healthcare spending doesn’t
arise from a standard corner solution and once the first hurdle is passed Tobit
censoring is no longer relevant (Jones, 1989) .26 First hurdle dominance implies:
P (y∗1i  0, y∗2i  0) = P (y∗1i  0) and f (yi|y∗1i  0, y∗2i  0) = f (yi|y∗1i  0). The
likelihood function in this case is:
L =
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(x′1iβ1)]1−Ii
n∏
i=1
[
1
σ
Φ
(
x′1iβ1+
ρ×(yTi −x′2iβ2)
σ
(1−ρ2)1/2
)
φ
(
yTi −x′2iβ2
σ
)]Ii
(1.5)
(c) Complete dominance: If independence is also assumed (ρ = 0 ) along with
the first hurdle dominance, then Jones’s double-hurdle model reduces to two-part
model.27 The likelihood function in this case is:
L =
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(x′1iβ1)]1−Ii
n∏
i=1
[
1
σ
Φ(x′1iβ1)φ
(
yTi −x′2iβ2
σ
)]Ii
(1.6)
To choose the best - fitting model, likelihood ratio (LR) test is used when the models
are nested and Vuong (1989) and Clarke (2003) tests are used when the models are
non-tested. Vuong’s test is: 28
V =
n1/2m¯
ωˆm
∼ N(0, 1) (1.7)
where,
mi = lnLi,1 − lnLi,229 , m¯ = 1
n
n∑
i=1
mi and ωˆ
2
m =
1
n
n∑
i=1
m2i − m¯2
If V is greater than the critical value, e.g., 1.96, the first model is preferred; if V is
less than -1.96, the second model is preferred; and otherwise neither model is preferred
(Yen, 2005). The Clarke test is a non-parametric test and applies the paired sign test to
the differences in the individual log-likelihoods from two nonnested models.
26In other words, the observed zero consumption is only determined by the participation decision and
not the consumption decision.
27The two-part model doesn’t have latent variable representation. In addition, there is no assumption
about the unconditional mean, only about the conditional /selected sample (Jones, 2000).
28See also Greene (2012) for Vuong test.
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To provide the economic interpretation, I compute the average partial effects (APE) of
probability, conditional level, and unconditional level with respect to binary variables and
average elasticities of probability, conditional level, and unconditional level with respect
to continuous variables (Long, 1997). For statistical inference, I calculate the standard
error for estimated elasticities and estimated APE using nonparametric bootstrapping.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I report the results for the double-hurdle model. Before that, I present
the description of the variables in Table 1.2 and descriptive statistics of these variables
in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3 provides the summary statistics (mean and standard deviation) separately
for the total sample and for sub-samples with non-zero healthcare spending and zero
healthcare spending. The sample is restricted to household heads under 65 years of age to
avoid heterogeneous spending resulting from retirement, social security income eligibility,
and Medicare eligibility for those 65 years old and over (Galama et al., 2012).30 Since
there are five different matched datasets corresponding to five imputed SCF datasets,
there will be five sets of summary statistics which are then combined according to the
Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987).
Households with positive healthcare spending and zero healthcare spending differ in
terms of age, marital status, education, race, household size, occupation, health insurance
status, income, and wealth components. Irrespective of the gross or net wealth measures,
households with positive healthcare spending have higher income and higher financial
wealth , housing wealth, and other real estate wealth. In addition, they are more likely
30I do not drop renters; I assign housing wealth of $1 for all renters. This is necessary because excluding
renters would result in the drop of about one-fourth of total households with positive financial wealth
which may bias the estimated financial wealth effect.
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to be older, white, married, and insured, and have higher education and larger family
size (Table 1.3).
On the basis of variables defined in Table 1.2, the explanatory variables in the first
stage and second stage equations of the double-hurdle model can be written as 31:
x′1iβ1 =β1,0 + β1,1Age 36-49 + β1,2Age 50-64 + β1,3Married + β1,4High school+
β1,5Some school + β1,6African American + β1,7Other race+
β1,8Household size 2 + β1,9Household size 3 + β1,10Household size 4+
β1,11Managers and professional + β1,12Administrative + β1,13Service+
β1,14Operators + β1,15Other + β1,16Insured + β1,16Insured
x′2iβ2 =β2,0 + β2,1Age 36-49 + β2,2Age 50-64 + β2,3Married + β2,4High school+
β2,5Some school + β2,6African American + β2,7Other race+
β2,8Household size 2 + β2,9Household size 3 + β2,10Household size 4+
β2,11Managers and professional + β2,12Administrative + β2,13Service+
β2,14Operators + β2,15Other + β2,16Insured + β2,17Income+
β2,18Financial wealth + β2,19Housing wealth + β2,20Other real estate wealth
The important issue in the double-hurdle model is the selection of explanatory vari-
ables in the first stage and second stage equations. However, theory provides no guidance
in this regard (Newman, Henchion, and Matthews, 2003). In most empirical studies, the
first-stage (participation) equation of the double-hurdle model includes the demographic
variables and other non-economic variables (Aristei, Perali, and Pieroni, 2008; Okunade,
Suraratdecha, and Benson, 2010; Yen, 2005). The exclusion of the economic variables in
31Both the first and second stage equations also include year dummies, but these are not shown in the
equations above.
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the first stage equation is motivated by the discrete random preference theory which sug-
gests that sample selection is determined exclusively by non-economic factors (Aristei,
Perali, and Pieroni, 2008; Yen, 2005). The second stage equation augments the vari-
ables in first stage equation with the economic variables (income and wealth variables).32
Throughout the analysis economic (income and wealth) variables are logged. For, house-
holds reporting zero for wealth components, log-values are recoded to zero. To be specific,
the components of gross wealth are transformed using ln(gross wealth) + 1, whereas the
components of net wealth are transformed using sign(net wealth) × ln(|net wealth| + 1)
(S. Brown and Taylor, 2008; Bricker and Bucks, 2013). 33
The dependent variable in the second stage equation is transformed using natural
logarithm to take into account positive skewness and thick tails (Manning, 1998; Aristei,
Perali, and Pieroni, 2008; Zhang, Huang, Lin, and Epperson, 2008; Okunade, Surarat-
decha, and Benson, 2010).34 Histogram and kernel density plots for levels of healthcare
spending and natural logarithm of positive healthcare spending are shown in Figures 1.2a
and 1.2b, respectively. Figure 1.2b shows that the distribution of the natural logarithm
of positive healthcare spending is more likely to be normally distributed. 35
32The current income, wealth, and demographic and human capital variables in the second stage proxy
household permanent income (Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009). This specification permits the
examination of independent effects of housing and financial wealth on healthcare spending. Alter-
natively, one can compute household permanent income by regressing current income on wealth and
demographic and human capital variables as in Goodman and Kawai (1982) and Goodman (1989).
However, this specification is not useful here.
33 The derivative of transformed net wealth (netwealth*) with respect to the untransformed net
wealth(netwealth) is given by,
∂netwealth*
∂netwealth
=
1
|netwealth|+ 1
34There is only one observation with healthcare spending less than one dollar in which case logarithmic
transformation generates negative value. I set this to zero. Dropping the observation, however, didn’t
change the result.
35These graphs are based only on the first imputation. Similar graphs are obtained for other four
imputations.
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1.4.1 Specification Test
In this analysis, I use the LR test and Vuong test and Clarke nonparametric test to
test the dependent double-hurdle model against its alternative nested and non-nested
models. Table 1.4 presents the results of the tests. The first row of Table 1.4 shows
that LR tests rejects the hypothesis of independence of the error terms at 0.01 level of
significance. The second and third rows report the results from Vuong test and Clarke
test. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of “no difference” between dependent double-
hurdle model and Heckman model in favor of the dependent double-hurdle model at 0.01
significance level. In addition, the result from LR test suggests that Heckman model is
preferred to two-part model. Overall, results indicate that the dependent double-hurdle
model is preferable. 36
1.4.2 Analysis for Pooled Data
Table 1.5 summarizes the result of the maximum likelihood estimation of the de-
pendent double-hurdle model using gross wealth specification for pooled sample (1989-
2010)3738. To account for multiple imputations in the data, the regression results use
repeated imputation inference (RII) method of Rubin (1987). The results shows that
correlation coefficient between residuals from the participation equation and consump-
tion equation (rho) is -0.905 and statistically significant at 0.01 level. This suggests the
dependence of error and justifies that dependent double-hurdle model is preferred to the
36Clarke’s statistic is reported as number of positive values minus its expectation. The results reported in
Table 1.4 are based on the data using imputation 1. The results are similar when using other imputed
data .
37 Regarding the selection mechanism, the specification test favors dependent double-hurdle model over
independent double-hurdle mode, Heckman model, and two-part model. However, I also estimated the
Heckman model and find similar results (available upon request) .
38Following Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2013), the results are not weighted because the matched
data is not representative of US population. This is because annual household spending from CES is
based on the households who completed all five interviews and CES doesn’t provide sample weights to
adjust for the bias resulting from the excluding the households who did not complete all interviews.
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independent double-hurdle model.39
Table 1.5 shows that the non-economic explanatory variables have different effects on
the participation and consumption equations. For example, occupation dummies (Man-
agers and professional, Administrative, Service, Operators, Other) are significant and
positive in the participation equation, but significant and negative in the consumption
equation. With reference to the other non-economic variables, dummy variables related
to age, marital status, education, race, household size, and health insurance have ex-
pected signs and mostly significant in both participation and consumption equations.
For example, coefficients on education dummies suggest that higher education increases
both the probability and level of household healthcare spending. The pooled result also
shows that most of the estimates of year specific fixed effects are significant in the partic-
ipation equation, whereas all are significant in the consumption equation. This suggests
that stages of the economic cycle have different effects on the participation and consump-
tion equations. Moreover, the consumption equation of the double-hurdle model shows
that healthcare spending rise with the increase in income, housing wealth, and financial
wealth. This confirms the importance of total household resources or permanent income
in the model of household healthcare spending.
To provide the economic interpretation of the estimated parameters, I calculate three
types of marginal effects for binary variables and three types of elasticities for continuous
variables. The standard errors in each case are computed using non parametric boot-
strapping. Since there are five different regression results corresponding to five different
datasets, there will be five sets of average marginal effects and average elasticities which
are then combined according to the Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987).
39 See also results from Section 1.4.1.
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Table 1.6 reports the average elasticities for the income and wealth variables. The
results show that unconditional elasticities with respect to the income, financial wealth,
and housing wealth are positive and significant.40 In particular, the income elasticity
indicates that healthcare is a necessity good - the elasticity is well below unity. Table
1.6 also suggests that estimated elasticity of healthcare spending is larger for housing
wealth than for financial wealth. A 1 percent increase in housing wealth leads spending
to increase by 0.022 percent, whereas the same amount of increase in financial wealth
causes the spending to increase by about 0.010 percent. Table 1.6 also shows that other
real estate wealth doesn’t have any significant effect on the healthcare spending.
Table 1.7 presents the APE for the binary variables. The APE for probability indicates
the absolute change in participation probability, while conditional and unconditional APE
indicate relative change in healthcare spending since the dependent variable in the second
stage is the natural logarithm of healthcare spending. The results in Table 1.7 suggest
that middle aged households (age 36-49) are about 3.09 percent (on average) more likely
to have positive healthcare spending than other households, ceteris paribus. Middle aged
households spend 29.78 percent 41 more on healthcare conditional on participation, and
overall, spend 7.05 percent more than others. The corresponding figures are 5.60 percent,
78.03 percent, and 14.07 percent for older households (age 50-64).
Table 1.7 also indicates that married households, educated households, insured house-
holds, and households with large family size are individually associated with higher prob-
ability of positive healthcare spending and higher percentage of spending, conditional and
unconditional on positive spending. Among households of different ethnicities, African-
Americans are about 5.06 percent less likely to have positive spending than others, and
40 Since these variables do not enter in participation equation, the probability elasticities are close to
zero and so conditional and unconditional elasticities are nearly the same for these variables.
41This is given by (exp(0.26063)− 1) ∗ 100
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conditional on positive spending, consume about 22.65 percent less healthcare than oth-
ers. The unconditional level suggests that African - Americans consume about 9.43 per-
cent less than others. As to the occupation variable, households whose head is manager
and professional are 4.20 percent more likely to consume healthcare than other but, con-
ditional on consumption, consume about 0.61 percent less than others (not significant).
Overall, the average effect of the unconditional level indicates that households whose head
is manager and professional consume 4.63 percent more than others. Table 1.7 also shows
that other occupation dummies are significant for probability and conditional, although
mostly insignificant for unconditional level.
1.4.3 Analysis by SCF Survey Years
In order to examine how the income and wealth elasticities have changed over time,
separate double-hurdle models are estimated for each survey years of the SCF. Table 1.8
presents the corresponding elasticities using gross wealth specification. 42 Several inter-
esting results emerge. First, the income elasticity is statistically significant for all survey
years and ranges from 0.094 to 0.275.43 Second, housing wealth elasticity is relatively
large than financial wealth elasticity for all years. Third, financial wealth is statistically
significant only for 1998 and 2010 and appears to be trending up after 2004. Fourth,
housing wealth elasticity is statistically significant for all survey years and trend up from
0.0174 in 1998 to 0.0309 in 2007 and then trend down in 2010. Analysis by SCF survey
years also reveals the diminished housing wealth effect but increased financial wealth
effect following the Great Recession, when compared to the survey year of SCF before
the Great Recession. However, other real estate wealth elasticity is insignificant for all
survey years.
42APE for binary variables are not shown here, but are available upon request.
43Note that SCF is a triennial survey. So, wealth data are available only after 3 years.
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1.5 Robustness Check and Extension
In this section, I explain the results for the subgroup analysis by credit-constrained
and age and robustness check using net wealth specification.
1.5.1 Extension: Subgroup Analysis by Credit-Constrained
In order to assess how the income and wealth elasticities differ between credit con-
strained and unconstrained households, separate double-hurdle models are estimated. For
this purpose, I use questions on SCF relating to whether households have been denied
credit or discouraged from applying. In particular, the SCF asks the following questions
about households’ access to credit:
(i) In the past five years, has a particular lender or creditor turned down any request
you (or your husband/wife/partner) made for credit, or not given you as much
credit as you applied for?
(ii) Were you later able to obtain the full amount you or your (husband/wife/partner)
requested by reapplying to the same institution or by applying elsewhere?
(iii) Was there any time in the past five years that you or your (husband/wife/partner)
thought of applying for credit at a particular place, but changed your mind because
you thought you might be turned down?
Following Dogra and Gorbachev (2013) and Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998),
the households are defined as credit-constrained if they answer yes to question 1 and no
to question 2, or if they answer yes to question 3. That is households are defined as
credit-constrained if they were turned down for credit or received less that they applied
for, or were discouraged from applying for credit because they believed that they would
be turned down. Credit-constrained households are hypothesized to be more sensitive to
income and wealth than unconstrained households (Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles, 1998;
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Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter, 2009).
Table 1.9 reports the income and wealth elasticities for credit-constrained and un-
constrained households using gross wealth specification. Consistent with the expecta-
tion, housing wealth and income elasticities are higher for credit-constrained households.
However, financial wealth elasticity is significant for only unconstrained households.
1.5.2 Extension: Subgroup Analysis by Age
In this sub-section, I examine how the income and wealth elasticities differ across age
groups. In particular, I divide the households into three different age groups: aged 18-35,
aged 36-49, and aged 50-64. Separate estimates for three different age groups are shown
in Table 1.10 for gross wealth specification . Results in Table 1.10 show that income effect
is stronger for households aged 18-34 compared to older age groups (aged 36-49 and aged
50-64)44 , whereas housing wealth effect is stronger for households aged 50-64 compared
to younger age groups (aged 18-35 and aged 36-49). Moreover, financial wealth effect
is significant only for households aged 50-64. The fact that households aged 50-64 have
large housing wealth elasticities makes sense. These households are in near retirement
stage and are likely to use wealth for life-cycle reasons (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002;
Lehnert, 2004). Moreover, the higher housing wealth elasticity of households aged 18-34
compared to households aged 35-49 is also consistent with the economic theory: younger
households are more likely to be credit-constrained and thus use wealth purely as a buffer
stock (Gourinchas and Parker, 2002; Lehnert, 2004).
1.5.3 Robustness Check: Net Wealth instead of Gross Wealth
In this sub-section, I estimate the sensitivity of results in Sections 1.4.2, 1.4.3, 1.5.1,
and 1.5.2 by re-estimating the models using net wealth measures. For each forms of
44One possible explanation for higher income elasticity of the younger age groups is that they are more
likely to be credit-constrained.
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wealth, the net wealth is computed as the gross wealth minus debt. For example, home
equity is obtained as gross housing wealth minus mortgages and home equity loan. Ap-
pendix Tables A.2.2 and A.2.3 present the average elasticities for economic variables and
APE for binary variables based on estimated parameters from the double-hurdle model
in Appendix Table A.2.1 using pooled sample. In general, the results appear to be qual-
itatively similar. However, the estimated financial wealth and housing wealth elasticities
using net wealth specification are smaller in magnitudes compared to those using gross
wealth specification. In other words, households are less sensitive to net wealth measures
than to gross wealth measures. For example, a 1 percent increase in home equity re-
sults in the spending to increase by about 0.015 percent compared to 0.022 percent for
gross housing wealth (Table 1.6 and Appendix Table A.2.2). The lower elasticities for
net wealth measure relative to gross wealth measure suggest the possibility of measure-
ment error in assessing net wealth positions by households (Bostic, Gabriel, and Painter,
2009). In general, these results also hold for each SCF survey years (Appendix Table
A.2.4), subgroup analysis by credit-constrained (Appendix Table A.2.5) , and subgroup
analysis by age (Appendix Table A.2.6).
1.6 Conclusion
This study uses a matched data set constructed from the SCF and the CES to analyze
the impacts of housing and financial wealth on healthcare spending for the period 1989-
2010. Using the dependent double-hurdle model for the pooled sample, I find significant
housing and financial wealth effects. In addition, I document that the housing wealth
effect is larger than the financial wealth effect. These findings generally hold across
all survey years of the Survey of Consumer Finances. In particular, the estimates of
housing wealth elasticities range from 0.017 to 0.031 over the period of 1989-2010 and are
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highly significant throughout. In contrast, the estimates of financial wealth elasticities are
insignificant in most cases and range from -0.001 to 0.017. Analysis by SCF survey years
also reveals the diminished housing wealth effect but increased financial wealth effect
following the Great Recession, when compared to the survey year of the SCF before the
Great Recession. Furthermore, subsample analyses by age group and credit-constrained
show that the housing wealth effect is most pronounced among older aged households
and credit-constrained households, whereas the financial wealth effect is significant only
for older aged households and unconstrained households.
In general, the results are qualitatively similar when I use net wealth measure. How-
ever, the housing and financial wealth effects based on net wealth measure are smaller
compared to those using gross wealth measure. Overall, the study sheds light on differ-
ences in wealth effects from different types of wealth. The findings in the study are also
consistent with the previous literature that argues that model of household healthcare
spending should incorporate both current income and wealth (e.g., (Okunade, Surarat-
decha, and Benson, 2010)).
The estimated effects cannot be interpreted as causal. An endogeneity problem is
likely because there may be unobservable variables that are correlated with both health-
care spending and housing and financial wealth (for example, rates of time preference)
or there may be reverse causality whereby healthcare spending determines housing and
financial wealth , for example, higher healthcare spending may deplete the housing and
financial wealth. One way to address this is to instrument wealth variables such that
instruments are correlated with wealth variables but uncorrelated with the unobserved
factors that affect healthcare spending. For example, one could instrument the housing
wealth with local house prices. However, it is not possible to exploit the local house
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prices as an instrument since the geographic information (state/region) of households is
not available in the SCF . Nevertheless, the results on housing and financial wealth effects
in the paper provide new evidence on the existence of differences in the importance of
various forms of wealth for household healthcare spending.
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Table 1.1: Correlation coefficients for variables by survey years of SCF
1989 1992
CES log income SCF log income CES log income SCF log income
CES log income 1.000 0.781*** 1.000 0.719***
SCF log income 0.781*** 1.000 0.719*** 1.000
Healthcare spending 0.122*** 0.118*** 0.161*** 0.150***
Gross financial wealth 0.100*** 0.163*** 0.102*** 0.273***
Gross housing wealth 0.277*** 0.401*** 0.266*** 0.438***
Gross other real estate wealth 0.157*** 0.233*** 0.120*** 0.205***
Net financial wealth 0.097*** 0.166*** 0.098*** 0.268***
Home equity 0.210*** 0.331*** 0.192*** 0.329***
Other real estate equity 0.037** 0.054*** 0.097*** 0.137***
1995 1998
CES log income SCF log income CES log income SCF log income
CES log income 1.000 0.804*** 1.000 0.794***
SCF log income 0.804*** 1.000 0.794*** 1.000
Healthcare spending 0.167*** 0.176*** 0.165*** 0.172***
Gross financial wealth 0.096*** 0.136*** 0.034** 0.121***
Gross housing wealth 0.143*** 0.198*** 0.222*** 0.303***
Gross other real estate wealth 0.131*** 0.188*** 0.082*** 0.170***
Net financial wealth 0.091*** 0.130*** 0.033** 0.120***
Home equity 0.090*** 0.139*** 0.147*** 0.213***
Other real estate equity 0.093*** 0.186*** 0.013 0.049***
2001 2004
CES log income SCF log income CES log income SCF log income
CES log income 1.000 0.799*** 1.000 0.817***
SCF log income 0.799*** 1.000 0.817*** 1.000
Healthcare spending 0.166*** 0.156*** 0.244*** 0.231***
Gross financial wealth 0.087*** 0.096*** 0.146*** 0.204***
Gross housing wealth 0.289*** 0.394*** 0.346*** 0.437***
Gross other real estate wealth 0.127*** 0.198*** 0.139*** 0.186***
Net financial wealth 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.143*** 0.201***
Home equity 0.193*** 0.282*** 0.179*** 0.238***
Other real estate equity 0.097*** 0.149*** 0.093*** 0.120***
2007 2010
CES log income SCF log income CES log income SCF log income
CES log income 1.000 0.743*** 1.000 0.829***
SCF log income 0.743*** 1.000 0.829*** 1.000
Healthcare spending 0.181*** 0.191*** 0.261*** 0.264***
Gross financial wealth 0.115*** 0.161*** 0.143*** 0.259***
Gross housing wealth 0.278*** 0.399*** 0.232*** 0.375***
Gross other real estate wealth 0.077*** 0.175*** 0.136*** 0.163***
Net financial wealth 0.112*** 0.157*** 0.140*** 0.256***
Home equity 0.201*** 0.306*** 0.145*** 0.280***
Other real estate equity 0.097*** 0.192*** 0.055*** 0.080***
Notes: Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from
a two-tailed t- test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for
definitions of variables.
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Table 1.2: Definitions of the variables
Variable Definition
Dependent variable
Healthcare spending† Total healthcare spending
Explanatory variables
A. Binary variables
Age 18-35‡ 1 if ≤ 18 age of the household head (HH) ≤ 35
Age 36-49 1 if ≤ 36 age of the HH ≤ 49
Age 50-64 1 if ≤ 50 age of the HH ≤ 64
Married 1 if the HH is married/living with partner
Less than high school‡ 1 if the HH has an education of twelfth grade or less
High school 1 if the HH is a high school graduate
Some college or more 1 if the HH has an education of some college or more
White‡ 1 if the HH is white
African American 1 if the HH is African American
Other race 1 if the HH is not white or African American
Household size 1‡ 1 if the family size is 1
Household size 2 1 if the family size is 2
Household size 3 1 if the family size is 3
Household size 4 1 if the family size is 4 or more
Unemployed‡ 1 if the HH is unemployed
Manager and professional 1 if the HH’s job category is manager and professional
Administrative 1 if the HH’s job category is administrative support, technical, sales
Service 1 if the HH’s job category is service
Operators 1 if the HH’s job category is operator, assembler, laborer
Other 1 if the HH’s job category is other?
Insured 1 if at least one of the household members is covered by insurance
Year 1989‡ 1 if the SCF survey year is 1989
Year 1992 1 if the SCF survey year is 1992
Year 1995 1 if the SCF survey year is 1995
Year 1998 1 if the SCF survey year is 1998
Year 2001 1 if the SCF survey year is 2001
Year 2004 1 if the SCF survey year is 2004
Year 2007 1 if the SCF survey year is 2007
Year 2010 1 if the SCF survey year is 2010
B. Continous variables
Income† Annual income
Gross financial wealth† Gross financial wealth
Gross housing wealth† Gross value of primary residence (houses)
Gross other real estate wealth† Gross value of all residential real estate other than the primary residence
Net financial wealth† Net financial wealth
Home equity† Gross housing wealth minus mortgages and home equity loans
Other real estate equity† Gross other real estate wealth minus the mortgages and equity loans
Notes: † indicates that the variable is expressed in 2010 US dollars.‡ is the omitted category in the
model.?includes precision, production ,craft, repairing, farming, forestry, and fishing.
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Table 1.3: Summary statistics
Full sample Non zero HCS Zero HCS
Variables Mean Stdev Mean Stdev Mean Stdev
Healthcare spending 3052.87 3537.55 3281.60 3563.88 0.00 0.00
Age 18-35 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.45 0.50
Age 36-49 0.42 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.35 0.48
Age 50-64 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.40
Married 0.64 0.48 0.67 0.47 0.32 0.47
Less than high school 0.10 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.26 0.44
High School 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46
Some college or more 0.63 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.43 0.50
White 0.88 0.32 0.89 0.31 0.73 0.44
African American 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.21 0.40
Other race 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24
Household size 1 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.42 0.49
Household size 2 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.20 0.40
Household size 3 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.14 0.34
Household size 4 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.25 0.43
Unemployed 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.30 0.46
Manager and professional 0.34 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.15 0.36
Administrative 0.22 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.17 0.38
Service 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.37
Operators 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32
Other 0.08 0.26 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.28
Insured 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.52 0.50
Income 68932.73 61498.40 71707.02 61855.92 31902.80 41479.69
Gross financial wealth 252797.42 2229769.86 265731.28 2298388.31 80162.74 894388.27
Gross housing wealth 211204.54 481837.24 221734.63 492809.13 70654.13 261208.98
Gross other real estate wealth 44143.98 249055.11 46626.07 257159.99 11014.25 78031.96
Net financial wealth 236982.03 2228912.04 249486.96 2297913.84 70072.40 881045.54
Home equity 129512.86 433811.71 135954.04 444394.62 43539.22 237127.80
Other real estate equity 35125.72 325059.84 37242.75 336522.05 6868.68 60118.37
No. of observations 23361 23361 21732 21732 1628 1628
Notes: See Table 1.2 for definitions of the variables. HCS indicates healthcare spending.
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Table 1.4: Specification tests
Model Test type Test value P-value
Dependent DH model versus independent DH model LR 466.01 0.00
Dependent DH model versus Heckman model Vuong 15.24 0.00
Dependent DH model versus Heckman model Clarke 0.00
Heckman model versus two-part model LR 466.01 0.00
Notes: DH stands for double-hurdle model and LR stands for likelihood ratio test. All tests are conducted
using gross wealth specification for pooled sample (1989-2010)
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Table 1.5: ML estimation of the dependent double-hurdle model using gross
wealth specification
Dependent Variable: log(healthcare spending)
Participation equation Consumption equation
Age 36-49 0.2398*** (0.0285) 0.2006*** (0.0217)
Age 50-64 0.4756*** (0.0352) 0.4664*** (0.0249)
Married 0.3332*** (0.0357) 0.2398*** (0.0279)
High School 0.2313*** (0.0375) 0.1424*** (0.0325)
Some college or more 0.4053*** (0.0381) 0.1911*** (0.0328)
African American -0.3241*** (0.0368) -0.1617*** (0.0334)
Other race -0.1952*** (0.0568) -0.0534 (0.0440)
Household size 2 0.1582*** (0.0381) 0.1876*** (0.0311)
Household size 3 0.1365*** (0.0446) 0.2360*** (0.0351)
Household size 4 0.1579*** (0.0437) 0.2448*** (0.0350)
Manager and professional 0.3461*** (0.0401) -0.0888*** (0.0291)
Administrative 0.2552*** (0.0396) -0.1238*** (0.0295)
Service 0.1389*** (0.0428) -0.2138*** (0.0358)
Operators 0.1769*** (0.0454) -0.2830*** (0.0350)
Other 0.1128** (0.0500) -0.1840*** (0.0387)
Insured 0.2831*** (0.0251) 0.0439** (0.0180)
Year 1992 -0.1459** (0.0570) 0.0662* (0.0390)
Year 1995 -0.1937*** (0.0603) 0.3299*** (0.0408)
Year 1998 -0.0829 (0.0550) 0.2937*** (0.0348)
Year 2001 -0.1327** (0.0530) 0.3071*** (0.0341)
Year 2004 -0.2216*** (0.0560) 0.2751*** (0.0378)
Year 2007 -0.3257*** (0.0525) 0.3275*** (0.0349)
Year 2010 -0.2684*** (0.0515) 0.2908*** (0.0350)
Log of income 0.2018*** (0.0111)
Log of gross financial wealth 0.0099*** (0.0031)
Log of gross housing wealth 0.0223*** (0.0017)
Log of gross other real estate wealth -0.0020 (0.0020)
Constant 0.4547*** (0.0650) 4.2654*** (0.1093)
Sigma 1.2566*** (0.0066)
Rho -0.9051*** (0.0067)
Notes: All estimates are from the dependent double-hurdle model using gross wealth specification for
pooled sample (1989-2010). Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates for the participation equation and
consumption equation, respectively . The omitted categories for age, education, race, household size and
occupation are age 18-35, less than high school, white, household size 1, and unemployed, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observation varies from 23349 to 23376 depending on
the imputation number. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical
significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table 1.6: Average elasticities for pooled sample with respect to continuous
variables using gross wealth specification
Unconditional level
Income 0.2018*** (0.0120)
Gross financial wealth 0.0099*** (0.0030)
Gross housing wealth 0.0223*** (0.0020)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0020 (0.0020)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates are from double-hurdle models using
gross wealth specification. Since the continuous economic variables appear only in consumption equation,
probability average elasticity is close to zero and therefore, conditional level average elasticity is the same
as the unconditional level average elasticity. Number of observation varies from 23349 to 23376 depending
on the imputation number. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripted notations
next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote
significance at 1 % , 5%, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table 1.7: Average partial effects for pooled sample with respect to binary
variables using gross wealth specification
Probability Conditional level Unconditional level
Age 36-49 0.0309*** (0.0040) 0.2606*** (0.0200) 0.0705*** (0.0050)
Age 50-64 0.0560*** (0.0040) 0.5768*** (0.0230) 0.1407*** (0.0050)
Married 0.0459*** (0.0050) 0.3283*** (0.0270) 0.0965*** (0.0060)
High School 0.0286*** (0.0050) 0.1983*** (0.0340) 0.0595*** (0.0060)
Some college or more 0.0571*** (0.0060) 0.3004*** (0.0340) 0.1065*** (0.0080)
African American -0.0506*** (0.0070) -0.2568*** (0.0330) -0.0943*** (0.0090)
Other race -0.0288*** (0.0110) -0.1081** (0.0420) -0.0483*** (0.0140)
Household size 2 0.0198*** (0.0040) 0.2263*** (0.0300) 0.0530*** (0.0050)
Household size 3 0.0169*** (0.0050) 0.2691*** (0.0350) 0.0553*** (0.0070)
Household size 4 0.0200*** (0.0050) 0.2838*** (0.0350) 0.0609*** (0.0070)
Manager and professional 0.04200*** (0.0040) -0.0062 (0.0270) 0.0463*** (0.0060)
Administrative 0.0307*** (0.0040) -0.0634** (0.0280) 0.0261*** (0.0060)
Service 0.0170*** (0.0050) -0.1805*** (0.0370) -0.0055 (0.0070)
Operators 0.0212*** (0.0050) -0.2412*** (0.0330) -0.0092 (0.0060)
Other 0.0139** (0.006)0 -0.1567*** (0.0360) -0.0057 (0.0080)
Insured 0.0394*** (0.0040) 0.1197*** (0.0170) 0.0615*** (0.0050)
Notes: Average partial effects (APE) based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using gross
wealth specification for pooled sample (1989-2010). Probability APE indicates absolute change in par-
ticipation probability, conditional level and unconditional level APE indicates relative change in health-
care expenditures. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observation varies from
23349 to 23376 depending on the imputation number . Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a
two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for
definitions of variables.
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Table 1.8: Average elasticities by SCF survey years with respect to economic
variables using gross wealth specification
Unconditional level
Panel A: 1989 (No. of observations : 2254-2261)
Income 0.1797*** (0.0410)
Gross financial wealth 0.0123 (0.0120)
Gross housing wealth 0.0242*** (0.0060)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0036 (0.0060)
Panel B: 1992 (No. of observations : 2147-2159)
Income 0.2161*** (0.0450)
Gross financial wealth 0.0152 (0.0100)
Gross housing wealth 0.0204*** (0.0060)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0038 (0.0070)
Panel C: 1995 (No. of observations : 1803-1812)
Income 0.0943** (0.0410)
Gross financial wealth 0.0159 (0.0120)
Gross housing wealth 0.0188*** (0.0060)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0062 (0.0060)
Panel D: 1998 (No. of observations : 3391-3397)
Income 0.1513** (0.0280)
Gross financial wealth 0.0146 (0.0090)
Gross housing wealth 0.0174*** (0.0050)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0036 (0.0050)
Panel E: 2001 (No. of observations : 3955-3975)
Income 0.1650*** (0.0280)
Gross financial wealth 0.0070 (0.0080)
Gross housing wealth 0.0210*** (0.0050)
Gross other real estate wealth 0.0034 (0.0040)
Panel F: 2004 (No. of observations : 2257-2566)
Income 0.2751*** (0.0480)
Gross financial wealth -0.0012 (0.0100)
Gross housing wealth 0.0240*** (0.0050)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0020 (0.0050)
Panel G: 2007 (No. of observations : 3586-3600)
Income 0.2469*** (0.0290)
Gross financial wealth 0.0016 (0.0090)
Gross housing wealth 0.0309*** (0.0060)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0058 (0.0040)
Panel H: 2010 (No. of observations : 3633-3637)
Income 0.2666*** (0.0350)
Gross financial wealth 0.0165* (0.0090)
Gross housing wealth 0.0240*** (0.0050)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0007 (0.0050)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using
gross wealth specification for each SCF survey years (1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and
2010) . Since the continuous economic variables appear only in consumption equation, probability
average elasticity is close to zero and therefore, conditional level average elasticity is the same as the
unconditional level average elasticity. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses . Superscripted
notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test.
***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5%, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table 1.9: Average elasticities for constrained and unconstrained households
with respect to economic variables using gross wealth specification
Unconditional level
Panel A: Unconstrained households (No. of observations : 18774-18827)
Income 0.1883*** (0.0130)
Gross financial wealth 0.0092** (0.0040)
Gross housing wealth 0.0211*** (0.0020)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0021 (0.0020)
Panel B: Constrained households (No. of observations : 4528-4587)
Income 0.2392*** (0.0410)
Gross financial wealth 0.0074 (0.0070)
Gross housing wealth 0.0243*** (0.0040)
Gross other real estate wealth 0.0019 (0.0060)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using
gross wealth specification for unconstrained and constrained households. Since the continuous economic
variables appear only in consumption equation, probability average elasticity is close to zero and therefore,
conditional level average elasticity is the same as the unconditional level average elasticity. Households
are defined as credit-constrained if they were turned down for credit or received less that they applied
for, or were discouraged from applying for credit because they believed that they would be turned down.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate
the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5%, 10
% level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table 1.10: Average elasticities by age groups with respect to economic vari-
ables using gross wealth specification
Unconditional level
Panel A: Age 18-35 (No. of observations :6131-6139)
Income 0.3392*** (0.0380)
Gross financial wealth 0.0107 (0.0070)
Gross housing wealth 0.0201*** (0.0040)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0046 (0.0050)
Panel B: Age 36-49 (No. of observations : 9806-9816)
Income 0.1824*** (0.0180)
Gross financial wealth 0.0029 (0.0050)
Gross housing wealth 0.0186*** (0.0030)
Gross other real estate wealth 0.0010 (0.0030)
Panel C: Age 50-64 (No. of observations : 7404-7421)
Income 0.1537*** (0.0180)
Gross financial wealth 0.0141** (0.0060)
Gross housing wealth 0.0264*** (0.0040)
Gross other real estate wealth -0.0024 (0.0030)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using
gross wealth specification for Age 18-35, Age 36-49, and Age 50-64. Since the continuous economic
variables appear only in consumption equation, probability average elasticity is close to zero and therefore,
conditional level average elasticity is the same as the unconditional level average elasticity. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of
statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5%, 10 % level,
respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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CHAPTER 2 LOCAL HOUSE PRICES AND HEALTH
2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of local house prices on health and health behaviors
of the individuals using the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from
2001 to 2012. The conceptual approach is based on the pure wealth mechanism. Under
this mechanism, a decrease in local level house prices increases the likelihood that home-
owners will face a negative wealth shock. A negative wealth shock could result in the poor
health of the homeowners through the reduction in expenditures on preventive health-
care and physical activities which are considered as normal goods (Xu, 2013; Yilmazer,
Babiarz, and Liu, 2015; Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano, 2015). However, the shock could
also result in the reduction of the risky healthy behaviors such as smoking and alcohol
consumption (normal goods) which could positively impact homeowners’ health (Fichera
and Gathergood, 2013; Van Kippersluis and Galama, 2013). The directional impact on
health is thus ambiguous for homeowners. On the one hand, if house prices and rents
are positively correlated in a given area, renters face a positive wealth shock as house
prices fall, because it reflects that renting or potential buying become inexpensive. On
the other hand, the health effect for renters depends on whether the improved health
resulting from the increase in expenditures on preventive healthcare and physical activity
dominates the deterioration in health resulting from the rise in risky health behaviors or
vice-versa.
The health effect of the local house prices is identified by within-county variation in
house prices, relative to the fluctuations occurring in other counties. I interact the local
house prices with the education level, where lower level of education proxies the renters
and higher level of education proxies the homeowners, to allow the different health effects
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on homeowners and renters. In addition, I separately focus on housing boom period
(January 2001- October 2006) and housing bust period (November 2006-December 2012)
to allow asymmetric responses to increase and decrease in local house prices. I also
examine heterogeneity in the health effect of the local house prices by stratifying the
sample by gender.
The results indicate the evidence of relationships for weight-related health, physical
and mental health, and health behaviors. In particular, among those likely to be home-
owners, I find the evidence of positive effects of house prices on poor mental health and
binge drinking but a negative effect on physical activity. However, for those likely to be
renters, I document a positive impact of house prices on body mass index but negative
effects on physical health and smoking.
The subsample analysis also suggests substantial heterogeneity of the health effects
across gender. Additionally, I show that local house prices have asymmetric effects on
health outcomes. In particular, local house prices have relatively large and significant im-
pacts on binge drinking and physical activity during the housing bust period. Summariz-
ing the papers contribution, it first provides an empirical examination of the relationship
between local house prices and health and health behaviors by using the United States
(US) data covering a period of housing boom and housing bust. Second, it considers the
possibility of the asymmetry in health effects by separately focusing on boom and bust
of housing cycle.
In the paper, Section 2.2 provides the conceptual framework, and Section 2.3 presents
the previous literature. Section 2.4 describes the data, and Section 2.5 presents the
econometric model. Section 2.6 discusses the empirical results, and Section 2.7 presents
the extensions. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Conceptual Framework
Conceptually, local house prices can affect the health through the pure wealth mech-
anism. Under this mechanism, the decrease (increase) in local house prices increases
the likelihood that homeowners in a given area will face a negative (positive) wealth
shock. A wealth shock may affect peoples health by affecting the consumption of health-
related commodities such as preventive healthcare, physical activities, and risky healthy
behaviors which are considered normal goods (Xu, 2013; Fichera and Gathergood, 2013).1
Consider, for example, homeowners who experience negative wealth shocks resulting from
decreases in local house prices. These shocks may lead to the increase in the likelihood of
homeowners reducing the expenditures on preventive healthcare such as physician visits
and physical activities which may negatively impact the homeowners’ health (Yilmazer,
Babiarz, and Liu, 2015; Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano, 2015; Xu, 2013). However, the
shocks may also result in the reduction of the risky healthy behaviors such as smoking
and alcohol consumption which may positively impact homeowners’ health (Van Kipper-
sluis and Galama, 2013; Fichera and Gathergood, 2013). So, the overall effect on health
of a decrease in local house prices is ambiguous for homeowners. Similarly, an increase
in local house prices also has ambiguous effect on the health of the homeowners.
Note, however, that individuals who are not homeowners in a given area may also
experience health effects because of local house prices changes. For example, if the house
prices and rents are positively correlated in a given area, local house price decreases
represent a positive wealth shock to the renters because it reflects that renting or for
1Empirical studies show that decrease in house prices may decrease the non-housing consumption by
decreasing households perceived wealth, or by tightening borrowing constraints (Campbell and Cocco,
2007). Mian and Sufi (2014b) document that households use a part of money borrowed out of home
equity to finance home improvement. If this is the case, then a fall in the local house prices may increase
the likelihood of the unmet home repairs and maintenance and thus, may lead to poor health (Rohe
and Lindblad, 2013).
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those planning to buy a house in the future, buying become inexpensive (Fichera and
Gathergood, 2013; Ratcliffe, 2015). A positive wealth shock is therefore expected to
have positive impact on renters’ health through the increase in spending on preventive
healthcare or physical activities. However, this may be offset by the increase in the risky
healthy behaviors. Thus, the net effect on health of a change in local house prices is also
ambiguous for renters.
The directional impact of the local house prices on health will be more complex if local
house prices have spillover effects on unemployment. For example, Appendix Figure B.1.1
shows that the increase in the unemployment rate from 2006 to 2013 for the counties with
the big decline in house prices from 2006 to 2009 was twice as high as the rise in counties
with the smallest decline in house prices.2 Further, the health effect of local house prices
may be asymmetric. For example, during a housing bust period, many households may
find the values of their homes dropping below the value of their mortgages.3 This may
result in the increased psychological stress as these underwater households face a dilemma
of whether to continue staying in their homes. 4 Moreover, the foreclosures have negative
externality and thus may push local house prices further down as prices of all the homes
in the given area suffer.5 Health effects of homeowners and renters who are insulated from
the foreclosures may also deteriorate as a result of the negative externality of foreclosure
(Currie and Tekin, 2015).
2See also, http://houseofdebt.org/2014/05/22/employment-scars-of-housing-bust.html
3In 2011, 23 percent of all mortgaged house had negative equity and many of these have continued to
stay below (Mian and Sufi, 2014a).
4Households may continue stay in their homes if they exhibit nominal loss aversion (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Engelhardt, 2003), in which case they will experience problems in making mortgage
payments (Rohe and Lindblad, 2013) or walk away and allow the bank foreclose (Mian and Sufi, 2014a).
5This occurs because of the fire sale of the foreclosed property by the bank. The fire-sale price is then
used by other home buyers and appraisers to estimate the prices of all other homes in the given area
(Mian and Sufi, 2014a).
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2.3 Previous Literature
The present work is related to the literature that investigates the health effects of
local house prices and foreclosures (e.g., Fichera and Gathergood (2013); Ratcliffe (2015);
Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard (2015)). Three recent papers have considered the effects
on health. Fichera and Gathergood (2013), using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) from 1991 to 2008, look at the effect of the local house price movements on health.
They find that the increase in home equity reduces the likelihood of homeowners having
different kinds of health conditions. They further show that health effects occur through
two complementary channels: an increase in purchase of private medical insurance and an
increase in physical activity and leisure as a result of a decrease in work hours. Ratcliffe
(2015) also uses the BHPS and documents a positive correlation between house prices
and the mental wellbeing of both homeowners and nonhomeowners which is inconsistent
with the pure wealth mechanism. Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard (2015) investigate the
impact of foreclosures on health using the data from four US states - Arizona, California,
Florida, and New Jersey that have been among the hardest hit by the foreclosure crisis.
They document that zip codes with increases in foreclosures are associated with the rise
in the urgent and unscheduled hospital and emergency room visits during the period 2005
to 2009.
This paper extends the literature in two ways. First, I also use the US data and focus
on local house price fluctuations which have the potential to affect a larger population of
renters and homeowners compared to an event like foreclosure that affects only a subset
of homeowners. Second, I examine the health effects for the boom and bust of the housing
cycle separately, to accommodate a possible asymmetric effects of house prices.
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2.4 Data
To analyze the relationship between local house prices and health and health be-
haviors, I use the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data. The BRFSS is an
ongoing monthly telephone survey administered by the US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention to track health conditions and risk behaviors of the individuals age 18
and over. The BRFSS questionnaire mainly consists of core component and optional
modules. The core component consists of the questions asked by all states and includes
questions about height, weight, physical and mental health, health behavior (cigarette
smoking, alcohol consumption, and physical activity), and demography.
The optional modules consist of the questions on specific topics such as cancer sur-
vivorship, mental illness, and stigma which are asked by some states but not others.
In the present study, I focus on the core component of the BRFSS from 2001 to 2012.
Although the BRFSS is available since 1984, I do not use the data before 2001 because
of significant changes to the survey in that year (Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi,
2015). In addition, I restrict the sample to the individuals for whom county of residence
is publicly available to obtain a more localized measure of housing market conditions.6
This restriction results in a reduction of overall BRFSS sample by 8.3% to 20.5%, de-
pending on the year in question.7 In the following sections, I discuss the construction of
the variables and analysis sample used in the study.
2.4.1 Variable Construction
I categorize the variables into three groups: i) health variables, which serve as the
dependent variables; ii) housing market variable which serves as the explanatory variable
6For the period of 2001 to 2012, the BRFSS does not identity the county of residence for individuals
residing in a county with fewer than 50 respondents or a county with adult populations less than or
equal to 10,000 residents.
7BRFSS 2013 does not report county of residence.
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that is central to this paper; and iii) control variables that include demographic variables
(age, sex, education, marital status and race), group average income, local unemploy-
ment rate, and national stock market index. In the following paragraphs, I discuss the
measurement of these variables. 8
(i) Health variables : In line with the existing literature that investigates the impact
of business cycle 9, I focus on three main measures of individual health. I group the
variables into three general categories: weight-related health, physical and mental
health, and health behaviors (Charles and DeCicca, 2008). Weight-related health
and health behaviors are the channels through which the local house prices can affect
health, whereas the physical and mental health measure the individual’s reported
health directly (Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard, 2015).
• Weight-related health: I use body mass index (BMI) as a proxy for weight-
related health. BMI is a standard measure of fatness (Cawley, 2004) and is
defined as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. BMI is
constructed using self-reported height and weight. I transformed BMI using
natural logarithm to take into account positive skewness and thick tails.
• Physical and mental health: With respect to the physical health, I con-
struct a categorical variable ‘Physical health’ from the response to the following
question: ‘Would you say that in general your health is’. The variable takes
values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 if responses are poor, fair, good, very good, and excel-
lent respectively. As to the mental health, I construct a variable ‘Poor mental
health’ from the response to the following question: ‘Now thinking about your
8Appendix Table Table B.2.1A also provides the definitions of the variables and the data sources for the
variables.
9Ruhm (2005) and Charles and DeCicca (2008) use aggregate (state or MSA-level) unemployment rate,
while Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard (2015) use aggregate employment rate as a proxy for business
cycle.
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mental health, which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions,
for how many days during the past 30 days was your mental health not good?’
• Health behaviors: This category refers to cigarette smoking, alcohol con-
sumption, and physical activity. Under cigarette smoking, I use the response
to the following question: ‘Do you now smoke cigarettes every day, some days
or not at all?’ and create binary variables: ’current smoker’: that takes a value
of 1 if respondents are nondaily (current) smokers (those who answer ‘some
days’ ), and ‘daily smoker’ that takes a value of 1 if respondents are daily smok-
ers (those who answer ‘every day’). For alcohol consumption, I construct the
variable ‘Binge drinking’ from the response to the following questions : ‘Dur-
ing the past 30 days, on the days when you drank, about how many drinks
10 did you drink on the average?’.Finally, I create a binary variable reflecting
the physical activity from the response to the following question: ‘During the
past month, other than your regular job, did you participate in any physical
activities or exercises such as running, calisthenics, golf, gardening, or walking
for exercise?’. The variable takes a value of one if the individuals have par-
ticipated in any physical activities or exercises in the past month, and zero
otherwise.
(ii) Housing market variable: I use the Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI) from
Zillow.com, a website that provides house price data, as a proxy for local house
prices. The ZHVI is a hedonic index 11 and is based on detailed information about
the property (such as the size of the house, the number of bedrooms, and the
number of bathrooms) collected from public records (Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst,
10One drink is equivalent to a 12-ounce beer, a 5-ounce glass of wine, or a drink with one shot of liquor.
11The index is seasonally adjusted. For details on methodology, see
http://www.zillow.com/research/zhvi-methodology-6032/
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2010).12 An advantage of the ZHVI data relative to the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA) house price index is that it allows the examination of the impact of
the local house prices monthly instead of quarterly, and at the county level instead
of metropolitan or state level. Previous empirical studies find the ZHVI to have a
good accuracy. For example, Mian and Sufi (2009) show that for 2248 zip codes,
the house price changes for Fiservs Case Shiller Weiss indices and Zillow have
a correlation coefficient of 0.91. Huang and Tang (2012) also document similar
coefficient for 210 metropolitan areas for the house price changes for the FHFA
House Price Index and ZHVI.13 Figure 2.1a plots the national measure of monthly
ZHVI (nominal) for single primary residence for the sample period 2001 to 2012.
The sample period includes the housing market boom that started in January 2001
and peaked in November 2006 and housing market bust that started in November
2006 before it began to recover in January 2012.14 In nominal terms, house prices
increased 59.30 percent during the boom period and declined 20.65 percent during
the bust period. The overall house prices increase was 26.41 percent. The numbers
are similar when house prices are expressed in real terms. After converting the
ZHVI into January 2012 dollar terms using all items of CPI-U of BLS, house prices
increased 33.51 percent during the boom period and declined 29.60 during the bust
period. The overall house prices decrease was 6.01 percent. A similar pattern is
observed as shown in Figure 2.1b when I plot the monthly average county-level
12The indices are available at seven geographic levels: neighborhood, ZIP code, city, congressional dis-
trict, county, metropolitan area, state and the nation and are also available for home type, price tier
and number of bedrooms.
13Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst (2010) use the ZHVI for robustness check and document results similar
to that for the Case-Shiller index.
14The start of the housing bust is identified by looking at when prices peaked and then began to fall. This
was November 2006 for national measure of the ZHVI and October 2006 for average county measure
of the ZHVI. This is similar to that identified by Cohen, Coughlin, and Lopez (2012) using Standard
and Poors /Case-Shiller house price index and the FHFA Purchase-Only House Price Index.
50
ZHVI (nominal) for single primary residence. For the analysis, I use the average
of real ZHVI for single family residence during the three months ending with the
survey month or negative binomial models for count data.
(iii) Control variables: In line with previous studies, I include the following control
variables: age, gender, race and ethnicity, marital status, education and income
levels. Group average is used for income since individual income is likely to be
simultaneously determined with health status (Ruhm, 2005). 15The BRFSS reports
the income (in $) in the ranges: less than 10,000, 10,000-14,999, 15,000-19,999,
20,000-24,999, 25,000-34,999, 35,000-49,999, 50,000-74,999, and 75,000 and over.
For the estimation purpose, respondent’s income is assumed to be at the midpoint of
each range and 150 % of the top category and is then converted to 2012 year dollars
using the all-items of CPI-U of the Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS) (Ruhm, 2005).
The weighted average incomes are calculated for 36 demographic groups stratified
by sex (male versus female), age (25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, and 50-55), and
education (less than high school, high school or some college, and college) (Tekin,
McClellan, and Minyard, 2015). I also control for local macroeconomic condition to
alleviate the concern that it might be driving the relationship between local house
prices and health (Ruhm, 2005). Monthly county-level unemployment rate from
the BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics database is used as a proxy for local
macroeconomic condition .16 In addition, I control for stock market condition using
the natural log of the monthly mean daily market closing Dow Jones Industrial
Average indexes (DJIA) (Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard, 2015).17 Although the
15Estimates utilizing group-level variations are unlikely to suffer from omitted variable and endogeneity
bias, but will be less precisely estimated (Ruhm, 2005).
16I use the average of unemployment rates during the three months ending with the survey month.
17See http://measuringworth.com/datasets/DJA/index.php
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BRFSS provides information on individual unemployment, I do not control for it
because it is more likely to be endogenous (Ruhm, 2005).
2.4.2 Analysis Sample
The analysis sample after excluding the individuals for whom county of residence is not
publicly available in the BRFSS consists of approximately 3.9 million individual-month
observations for the years 2001-2012 inclusive. The sample size is further reduced after I
merge the ZHVI to the BRFSS data by county of residence and month of the interview
of the respondents. This is because the ZHVI is available only for 857 to 998 counties ,
depending on the year in question. The merged sample consists of approximately 2.67
million individual-month observations. The sample is further limited to individuals less
than age 65. After excluding missing data on control variables, I have a total sample size
of 1.67 million individual-month observations. However, analysis sample differs across
the outcome variables because of the omission of these variables. Table 2.1 provides the
descriptive statistics for the health outcome variables and the explanatory variables for
the full sample period (January 2001-December 2012).
2.5 Empirical Model
To measure the effect of local house price on individual health, I use the following
model:
Healthijmt =β0 + β11lnHousePricesjmt × HighSchoolijmt + β12lnHousePricesjmt×
SomeSchoolijmt + β13lnHousePricesjmt × Collegeijmt+
β21SomeCollegeijmt + β22Collegeijmt + δXijmt + µj + αm + λt + ijmt
(2.1)
Here, i denotes the individual, j denotes county of residence, m denotes month of the
interview, and t denotes year of the interview. Health represents one of the health vari-
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ables, lnHousePrices denotes log of the county-level house price 18, HighSchool, SomeCol-
lege, and College refer to high school or less than high school, some college, and college
and are used as the proxy for tenure status 19, and X is a vector of control variables (in-
dividual and county specific covariates). The house price is interacted with the education
level to allow the effect of the house prices to differ across those likely to be homeowners
and renters. In equation 2.1, I also include county fixed effects, µ , which control for any
fixed differences across counties.
Regarding fixed effects, α is a vector of month fixed effect and takes into account
the seasonal variations in some of the health outcome variables such as physical activity
(Ruhm, 2005). Variable λ represents fixed year effects, which control for any nationwide
trends and shocks that may influence health outcomes such as calorie content in national
chain restaurants or federal health policies (Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard, 2015). 
represents an idiosyncratic random error term. I use the linear regression model for
all dependent variables. 20 I report robust standard errors clustered at the county and
month, assuming that observations are independent across counties and calendar months,
but not within counties in a given month (Ruhm, 2005; Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller,
2011).21.
18Taking the log of house prices takes into account the diminishing marginal effects of house prices at
higher price levels, which is consistent with diminishing marginal utility of housing wealth (Ratcliffe,
2015).
19Ideally, one would want to use the information on the tenure variable, but this information is not
collected before 2009 in the BRFSS. Moreover, information for 2009 and 2010 contain considerable
missing data. A more serious issue, however, is that the tenure variable is likely to be endogeneous to
the health outcomes. One imperfect solution for this issue is to examine the effects across the level
of education as in Farnham, Schmidt, and Sevak (2011), where the individuals with lower level of
education (less than high school or high school) are assumed to be more likely to be renters and those
with higher level of education (some college or college graduate) to be more likely to be homeowners.
This requires that education to be exogenous with respect to the health outcomes as in previous studies
(e.g., Ruhm (2005); Charles and DeCicca (2008); Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard (2015)).
20For ease in the interpretation, I use the linear specification. However, I also estimate binary probit
models and find similar marginal effects.
21Clustering by county and month is important because house prices take the same values for respondents
interviewed in a county during a given month and year Ruhm (2005).
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The coefficients of primary interest are, β11 and β12. β11 (or β12 ) gives the effect of
the 1 % change in the local house prices for those with high school or lower than high
school education (some college or college), all else held constant. Inclusion of county
fixed effects implies that I use within-county variation in house prices to identify health
effects (Ruhm, 2005). To examine the existence of sufficient within county-variation in
house prices, I first regress monthly county house prices on year and month fixed effects.
The resulting regression yields an R-squared of only 0.0012. Second, I regress monthly
county house prices on county, year, and month fixed effects; the R-squared from this
regression is 0.9753. Thus, national trends alone explain only around 1.2% of the variation
in county house prices, and approximately around 2.5% of the variation in county house
prices cannot be explained. 22 The data is weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights.
In addition, the usefulness of county house prices depends on the existence of variation
that is independent of state house prices. This condition is satisfied. For instance, the
R-squared for an equation regressing county house prices on state house prices, year, and
month fixed effects is just 0.1612. Hence, there appears to be substantial variation in
county house prices, relative to corresponding state house prices.
For each health outcome variables as described in the Section 2.4.1, equation 2.1 is
estimated for the full sample period (January 2001- December 2012). I also estimate
equation 2.1 separately for the housing boom period (January 2001-October 2006) and
bust period (November 2006-December 2012) to allow an asymmetric impact of house
price increases and decreases on individual health and health behaviors.
Tekin, McClellan, and Minyard (2015) describe two sources of endogeneity: a) statis-
tical endogeneity that results when the unobservable variables are correlated with both
22McInerney and Mellor (2012) also use the similar approach to examine the existence of sufficient
within-state variations.
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health outcome variables and local house prices and b) structural endogeneity that occurs
when individual health outcomes determines the local house prices (reverse causality).
The present study is less likely to suffer from either types of endogeneity, since it is less
likely that individual unobservables will be correlated with the local house prices or that
individual health causes the fluctuations in local house prices.23 In other words, the as-
sumption that local house price changes are exogenous to an individual health is more
likely to hold here.
2.6 Results
Column 2 of Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the estimated effect of local house price
on weight-related health for the full sample period. The results suggest that local house
prices have a statistically significant impact only for the individuals with high school
degree. In particular, the coefficient estimate on the interaction of house prices and
high school term implies that a one percent increase in local house prices increases BMI
by 0.007 percent. Thus for those most likely to be renters, a negative wealth shock
resulting from the increase in local house prices is likely to worsen weight problem. One
shortcoming with the estimates using the full sample period is that they mask differences
across the housing boom period and bust period. To alleviate this concern, I estimate
the model separately for the housing boom period (January 2001-October 2006) and bust
period (November 2006-December 2012). Column 3 presents results for the housing boom
period, and column 4 displays the results for the housing bust period. The coefficient
estimates do not indicate significant asymmetric relationship between local house prices
and BMI.
Panel B of Table 2.2 displays results related to the physical and mental health. Results
23For example, one would expect that those with better health would move to counties with higher house
prices.
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in column 2 suggest that local house prices have a significant negative impact on physical
health for the individuals with high school degree and significant positive impact on poor
mental health for the individuals with college degree. Looking at the results for boom
and bust in columns 3 and 4, there appears to be significant asymmetric relationship
between local house prices and physical health but not poor mental health. For example,
the results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that for the individuals with high school degree,
physical health worsens when local house prices increase (boom period), but the decrease
in local house prices (bust period) has no statistically significant impact on physical
health.
Panel C of Table 2.2 shows the estimated effect of local house prices on health be-
haviors. The estimates in column 2 indicate that for those likely to be homeowners, the
local house prices have a positive and significant impact on binge drinking but a negative
and significant impact on physical activity. The results also suggest that for those likely
to be renters, local house prices have a negative and significant impact on daily smoking.
Moreover, the coefficient estimates in columns 3 and 4 indicate an asymmetry in health
effects for binge drinking and physical activity. In particular, local house prices have rel-
atively larger (in magnitude) impacts on binge drinking and physical activity during the
bust . In addition, impacts are more pronounced among those likely to be homeowners
for binge drinking in the boom and the bust and physical activity in the bust.
2.7 Extension
Previous study (Fichera and Gathergood, 2013) documents that health effects of local
house price are stronger for female than male. In the light of these findings, this section
examines whether the health effects vary by gender. As before, I present the results
separately for the full sample period, boom period, and bust period.
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The estimated effects of local house price on health and health behaviors are presented
in Table 2.3 for males and Table 2.4 for females. As before, Panels A-C present the
estimates for weight-related health, physical and mental health, and health behaviors,
respectively, and columns 2-4 report the estimates for the full sample period, boom
period, and bust period, respectively .
The results in column 2 of Panel A of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that an increase
in local house prices significantly raises the BMI for females and those most likely to
be renters, but has no significant effect for males and those most likely to be renters.
This finding is consistent with Schmeiser (2009) who documents the significant positive
income effect on BMI for low-income females with Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
eligible earnings but not for low-income males with EITC-eligible earnings. A separate
analysis for the housing boom and the bust in columns 3 and 4 (Panel B of Tables 2.3 and
2.4) show the absence of asymmetric relationship between local house prices and BMI for
both male and female.
Panel B of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the estimated effect of local house prices on
the physical and mental health for male and female, respectively. Column 2 in Panel B
of Table 2.3 shows that for male and those likely to be renters, local house price have
negative and significant impact on physical health, whereas column 2 in Panel B of Table
2.4 reveals that for female and those likely to be homeowners, local house price have
positive and significant impact on poor mental health. A separate analysis for the boom
and the bust in columns 3 and 4 (Panel B of Tables 2.3 and 2.4) shows that there is an
asymmetric relationship between local house prices and physical health for only male.
Panel C of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 display the estimated effect of local house prices on
health behaviors. The results in column 2 in Table 2.3 imply that among male and those
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likely to be homeowners, local house prices have positive and significant impact on binge
drinking and smoking but negative and significant impact on physical activity. For male
renters, the local house prices have a positive impact on binge drinking, with the impact
being smaller than those likely to be homeowners. Among female and those likely to be
homeowners (renters), there is significant negative relationship between house prices and
physical activity (smoking).
Looking at the boom and the bust, the results in columns 3-4 in Panel C of Tables
2.3 and 2.4 reveal different patterns for male and female. For the male homeowners,
house prices are positively and significantly related to the smoking both in the boom and
the bust, but the impact is relatively larger in the bust. Results also suggest that binge
drinking decreases, but physical activity increases, with the fall in house prices during
the bust for both homeowners and renters. Closer inspection also show that the impact is
larger for those likely to homeowners than those likely to be renters. Among female in the
bust, a decrease in local house prices increases smoking for those likely to be renters and
decreases drinking for those likely to be homeowners. In addition, the significant negative
impact on physical activity is observed for the female in the bust, with the impact being
relatively larger for those likely to be homeowners.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the impact of local house prices on health and health
behaviors of the individual using the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System data
from 2001 to 2012. The results indicate the evidence of relationship for weight-related
health, physical and mental health, and health behaviors. In particular among those
likely to be homeowners, I find the evidence of positive effects of local house prices on
poor mental health and binge drinking but negative effect on physical activity. However,
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for those likely to be renters, I document a positive impact of house prices on body mass
index but negative effects on physical health and smoking. The impacts of local house
prices on drinking and smoking are consistent with a pure wealth effect.
I also find substantial heterogeneity of the health effects across gender. Specifically
for male homeowners, local house prices have a positive and significant impact on binge
drinking and smoking, but a negative and significant impact on physical activity. Among
female homeowners, local house prices have a positive and significant impact on poor
mental health but a negative and significant impact on physical activity. Moreover, local
house prices have a positive (negative) impact on binge drinking (physical health) for
male renters but a negative (positive) impact on smoking (body mass index) for female
renters.
Additionally, I show that local house prices have an asymmetric effect on health.
In particular, local house prices have relatively large and significant impacts on binge
drinking and physical activity during the housing bust period. The asymmetric effect
is, however, absent for weight-related health, physical health, and poor mental health. I
also find that health effects are different for the boom and the bust when the subgroup
analysis is conducted by gender.
Overall, the findings suggest the relationship between local house prices and indi-
vidual’s health and health behaviors. The results also imply that health effects depend
on which aspects of economic upturns or downturns are being considered (Ruhm, 2005;
Fichera and Gathergood, 2013; Charles and DeCicca, 2008; Tekin, McClellan, and Min-
yard, 2015).
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Figure 2.1a: National measure of monthly house price and unemployment rate
Figure 2.1b: County measure of monthly house price and unemployment rate
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Health Outcome Variables
BMI 1534800 3.293 0.204
Physical Health 1666579 3.639 1.057
Poor Mental Health 1598792 3.877 7.977
Binge Drinking 880315 1.081 3.390
Current Smoker 755782 0.457 0.498
Daily Smoker 755782 0.337 0.473
Physical Activity 1662951 0.788 0.409
Housing Market Variable
County House Price (in ‘000) 1671016 252.228 287.645
Control Variables
County Unemployment Rate 1671016 6.499 2.704
Stock Market Index 1671016 9.296 0.147
High School 1671016 0.313 0.464
Some College 1671016 0.278 0.448
College 1671016 0.409 0.492
Age 1671016 45.054 12.002
Married 1671016 0.575 0.494
Divorced 1671016 0.152 0.359
Widowed 1671016 0.033 0.179
Other Marital Status 1671016 0.240 0.427
Mean Income (in ‘000) 1671016 68.706 26.950
White 1671016 0.754 0.431
African American 1671016 0.096 0.294
Hispanic 1671016 0.084 0.278
Other Race 1671016 0.067 0.250
Male 1671016 0.405 0.491
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the full sample period (January 2001-December 2012). See Appendix
Table 2.1 for definitions of variables.
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Table 2.2: Estimated effect of local house prices on health and health behaviors
All Boom Bust
Panel A: Estimated effect of local house prices on weight-related health
Log of BMI (N = 1534800) (N = 547855) (N = 986945)
Log of County House Price × High School 0.00686* (0.0041) 0.00717 (0.0052) 0.00424 (0.0061)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.00144 (0.004) 0.0064 (0.0044) -0.00383 (0.0057)
Log of County House Price × College -0.00319 (0.0041) -0.00211 (0.0044) -0.00665 (0.0055)
County Unemployment Rate 0.00012 (0.0003) 0.0027*** (0.0007) 0.00037 (0.0005)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.00106 (0.003) -0.00843 (0.0094) 0.00029 (0.0041)
Panel B: Estimated effect of local house prices on physical and mental health
Physical Health (N = 1666579) (N = 645746) (N = 1020833)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.04068** (0.0153) -0.05601* (0.0306) 0.02213 (0.0315)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.0061 (0.0141) -0.02183 (0.0298) 0.07517*** (0.0274)
Log of County House Price × College -0.01515 (0.0144) -0.03667 (0.0282) 0.05029 (0.0317)
County Unemployment Rate 0.00058 (0.002) -0.00144 (0.0044) 0.00208 (0.0025)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.01431 (0.0171) -0.09167** (0.0407) 0.05828*** (0.0204)
Poor Mental Health (N = 1598792) (N = 585140) (N = 1013652)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.00574 (0.1348) 0.07764 (0.2554) -0.08417 (0.1707)
Log of County House Price× Some College 0.17779 (0.1475) 0.24694 (0.2717) 0.08985 (0.1901)
Log of County House Price× College 0.30194** (0.1295) 0.26978 (0.2435) 0.26047 (0.1863)
County Unemployment Rate 0.00546 (0.0178) -0.00117 (0.0171) 0.01566 (0.0166)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.30703* (0.1739) -0.1554 (0.4208) -0.36661* (0.1912)
Panel C: Estimated effect of local house prices on health behaviors
Binge Drinking (N = 880315) (N = 303561) (N = 576754)
Log of County House Price× High School 0.02244 (0.054) -0.0265 (0.1591) 0.36966** (0.1676)
Log of County House Price× Some College 0.131** (0.0641) 0.17369 (0.162) 0.42948** (0.1748)
Log of County House Price× College 0.16483** (0.0713) 0.23707 (0.1716) 0.45239*** (0.1637)
County Unemployment Rate -0.0085 (0.0064) -0.01227 (0.0162) -0.01003 (0.0106)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.12162 (0.1088) 0.07063 (0.1275) -0.19358 (0.1486)
Current Smoker (N = 755782) (N = 302774) (N = 453008)
Log of County House Price× High School 0.00022 (0.0079) 0.01871 (0.0234) 0.00144 (0.0216)
Log of County House Price× Some College 0.00885 (0.0099) 0.02042 (0.025) 0.01333 (0.0226)
Log of County House Price× College 0.01607 (0.011) 0.02941 (0.0225) 0.01819 (0.0226)
County Unemployment Rate -0.0019 (0.0015) -0.00462 (0.0029) -0.00229* (0.0013)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.02818* (0.0144) -0.00255 (0.0252) -0.03592** (0.0177)
Daily Smoker (N = 755782) (N = 302774) (N = 453008)
Log of County House Price× High School -0.01218** (0.0054) 0.00158 (0.0151) -0.00695 (0.0158)
Log of County House Price× Some College 0.00415 (0.0064) 0.0114 (0.0155) 0.01482 (0.0152)
Log of County House Price× College 0.01537 (0.0095) 0.02759 (0.0176) 0.02321 (0.0161)
County Unemployment Rate -0.00162 (0.0012) -0.00211 (0.0026) -0.00172 (0.0017)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.03141*** (0.0112) -0.00502 (0.0246) -0.03743** (0.0176)
Activity (N = 1662951) (N = 646592) (N = 1016359)
Log of County House Price× High School -0.01349 (0.0147) 0.02437 (0.0189) -0.03689*** (0.0104)
Log of County House Price× Some College -0.01756 (0.013) 0.007 (0.0171) -0.03592*** (0.0112)
Log of County House Price× College -0.02724** (0.0118) 0.00486 (0.0168) -0.05031*** (0.0116)
County Unemployment Rate 0.00447*** (0.0014) 0.00332* (0.0019) 0.00241** (0.001)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.01149 (0.0101) -0.01197 (0.0154) 0.01183 (0.0128)
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All estimates are from linear models and uses the sample weights provided by the BRFSS.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 present the estimates for the full sample period, housing boom period, and housing
bust period, respectively. Panels A, B, and C display the estimates for the weight-related health (BMI(log
of body mass index), physical and mental health, and health behaviors (binge drinking, current smoker,
daily smoker, and activity), respectively. Models include controls for education (omitted category is
high school or less than high school), county unemployment rate, log of Dow Jones Industrial Average,
marital status (omitted category is single/separated), group average income, race (omitted category is
white), and male. Standard errors clustered at the county and month level are in parenthesis. Number
of observation (N) varies across the health outcomes. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients
indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % ,
5 %, 10 % level, respectively. See Appendix Table B.2.1 for definitions of variables.
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Table 2.3: Estimated effect of local house prices on health and health behaviors
for male
All Boom Bust
Panel A: Estimated effect of local house prices on weight-related health
Log of BMI (N = 635976) (N = 227907) (N = 408069)
Log of County House Price × High School 0.00218 (0.0049) 0.00699 (0.0079) 0.00535 (0.0066)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.00132 (0.005) 0.00993 (0.0077) -0.00207 (0.0068)
Log of County House Price × College -0.00598 (0.0054) -0.00242 (0.0079) -0.00307 (0.007)
County Unemployment Rate 0.04848** (0.0181) -0.03205 (0.0372) 0.09705*** (0.0255)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.00217*** (0) 0.00209*** (0.0001) 0.00221*** (0.0001)
Panel B: Estimated effect of local house prices on physical and mental health
Physical Health (N = 674571) (N = 263811) (N = 410760)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.05581*** (0.015) -0.09897** (0.0393) 0.03925 (0.0397)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.00925 (0.0149) -0.07502** (0.0301) 0.09793*** (0.0327)
Log of County House Price × College -0.02148 (0.0148) -0.08074** (0.0328) 0.08186** (0.0372)
County Unemployment Rate -0.37442** (0.143) -0.08483 (0.217) -0.53107*** (0.1876)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.01859*** (0.0003) -0.01778*** (0.0004) -0.01919*** (0.0004)
Poor Mental Health (N = 646228) (N = 238240) (N = 407988)
Log of County House Price × High School 0.04404 (0.1612) 0.19114 (0.4274) 0.08726 (0.2244)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.02435 (0.1916) 0.17974 (0.4652) -0.0247 (0.2031)
Log of County House Price × College 0.14139 (0.1825) 0.21958 (0.4532) 0.19346 (0.2172)
County Unemployment Rate 0.54939 (0.7855) -0.19024 (2.1672) 1.1087 (1.0862)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.00917*** (0.0025) 0.00244 (0.0041) 0.01339*** (0.002)
Panel C: Estimated effect of local house prices on health behaviors
Binge Drinking (N = 397489) (N = 139425) (N = 258064)
Log of County House Price × High School 0.13856** (0.0681) 0.14156 (0.2621) 0.56706** (0.2372)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.26863*** (0.0763) 0.42086 (0.275) 0.622** (0.2428)
Log of County House Price × College 0.30311** (0.1135) 0.48124 (0.294) 0.64623** (0.252)
County Unemployment Rate -2.16674*** (0.6959) -4.01843*** (1.4614) -1.23945 (0.7807)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.02485*** (0.0015) -0.0307*** (0.0022) -0.02097*** (0.0018)
Current Smoker (N = 333100) (N = 134132) (N = 198968)
Log of County House Price × High School 0.00946 (0.0144) 0.02834 (0.0366) 0.03241 (0.0281)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.02347 (0.0159) 0.03572 (0.0428) 0.04949 (0.0303)
Log of County House Price × College 0.02949** (0.0144) 0.04057 (0.0357) 0.05475* (0.029)
County Unemployment Rate -0.23666** (0.0884) -0.15141 (0.1526) -0.27634** (0.1099)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.00763*** (0.0001) -0.00853*** (0.0002) -0.00694*** (0.0002)
Daily Smoker (N = 333100) (N = 134132) (N = 198968)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.00284 (0.0101) 0.00942 (0.0235) 0.02207 (0.0275)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.01444 (0.01) 0.01942 (0.0263) 0.04513 (0.0284)
Log of County House Price × College 0.02964** (0.0118) 0.04194* (0.0232) 0.05607** (0.0272)
County Unemployment Rate -0.29795*** (0.0953) -0.20991 (0.1641) -0.36621** (0.164)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.00336*** (0.0002) -0.0039*** (0.0003) -0.00294*** (0.0002)
Activity (N = 672892) (N = 264161) (N = 408731)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.01001 (0.0166) 0.04856* (0.0265) -0.0323* (0.0192)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.01631 (0.0165) 0.0237 (0.0259) -0.02999 (0.0208)
Log of County House Price × College -0.02575* (0.0139) 0.02765 (0.0246) -0.04819** (0.0196)
County Unemployment Rate 0.16144*** (0.0466) 0.39898*** (0.1153) 0.04963 (0.0748)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.0039*** (0.0001) -0.00383*** (0.0002) -0.00399*** (0.0002)
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All estimates are from linear models and uses the sample weights provided by the BRFSS.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 present the estimates for the male sub-sample of full sample period, housing boom
period, and housing bust period, respectively. See notes of Table 2.2 for others.
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Table 2.4: Estimated effect of local house prices on health and health behaviors
for female
Panel A: Estimated effect of local house prices on weight-related health
Log of BMI (N = 898824) (N = 319948) (N = 578876)
Log of County House Price × High School 0.01018** (0.0048) 0.00907 (0.0105) 0.0023 (0.0076)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.00444 (0.0046) 0.00404 (0.0086) -0.00408 (0.0072)
Log of County House Price × College -0.00105 (0.0052) -0.00128 (0.01) -0.00934 (0.0085)
County Unemployment Rate 0.06227*** (0.0138) 0.05286 (0.0391) 0.07072** (0.0286)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.00341*** (0) 0.00356*** (0.0001) 0.00331*** (0.0001)
Panel B: Estimated effect of local house prices on physical and mental health
Physical Health (N = 992008) (N = 381935) (N = 610073)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.02234 (0.0194) -0.0138 (0.0409) 0.00505 (0.035)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.02303 (0.0165) 0.0295 (0.0377) 0.05061 (0.0358)
Log of County House Price × College -0.00595 (0.0168) 0.00788 (0.0396) 0.01807 (0.0352)
County Unemployment Rate -0.34576** (0.1651) -0.32143 (0.2101) -0.34738** (0.1545)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.01609*** (0.0004) -0.01559*** (0.0004) -0.01647*** (0.0005)
Poor Mental Health (N = 952564) (N = 346900) (N = 605664)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.07424 (0.1906) -0.03564 (0.3317) -0.29621 (0.3484)
Log of County House Price × Some College 0.38658* (0.2267) 0.33996 (0.331) 0.20075 (0.4017)
Log of County House Price × College 0.46056** (0.1851) 0.33762 (0.3085) 0.31046 (0.3793)
County Unemployment Rate -6.04041*** (1.154) -5.03292*** (1.6033) -6.4563*** (1.2558)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.00056 (0.002) -0.00956** (0.0039) 0.00755*** (0.0024)
Panel C: Estimated effect of local house prices on health behaviors
Binge Drinking (N = 482826) (N = 164136) (N = 318690)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.06986 (0.069) -0.16405 (0.1621) 0.17223 (0.1352)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.02376 (0.0612) -0.11338 (0.1324) 0.20605* (0.1042)
Log of County House Price × College 0.00889 (0.0513) -0.04947 (0.1391) 0.22538** (0.1022)
County Unemployment Rate -0.75503 (0.5218) -0.77728 (0.7768) -0.62969 (0.7716)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.0148*** (0.0003) -0.01494*** (0.0009) -0.0147*** (0.0007)
Current Smoker (N = 422682) (N = 168642) (N = 254040)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.01307 (0.0099) 0.00508 (0.0164) -0.03884** (0.0185)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.00549 (0.0145) 0.0072 (0.0178) -0.02792 (0.021)
Log of County House Price × College 0.00059 (0.0123) 0.01816 (0.0126) -0.02611 (0.0236)
County Unemployment Rate -0.17368* (0.0883) -0.10421 (0.1204) -0.21642* (0.1113)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.0067*** (0.0001) -0.00709*** (0.0003) -0.00638*** (0.0002)
Daily Smoker (N = 422682) (N = 168642) (N = 254040)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.0245** (0.0091) -0.00317 (0.0129) -0.04536*** (0.0159)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.00609 (0.0128) 0.01071 (0.0082) -0.02139 (0.0191)
Log of County House Price × College -0.00181 (0.0109) 0.01665 (0.0163) -0.01845 (0.0198)
County Unemployment Rate -0.32488*** (0.1015) -0.27848* (0.1376) -0.38432*** (0.1116)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.00384*** (0.0002) -0.004*** (0.0002) -0.00369*** (0.0002)
Activity (N = 990059) (N = 382431) (N = 607628)
Log of County House Price × High School -0.01606 (0.0143) -0.00079 (0.0189) -0.03864*** (0.0103)
Log of County House Price × Some College -0.0177 (0.0117) -0.00971 (0.0149) -0.03956*** (0.0099)
Log of County House Price × College -0.02746** (0.0112) -0.01794 (0.0167) -0.04996*** (0.0115)
County Unemployment Rate 0.11333 (0.0734) 0.21285 (0.135) 0.09646 (0.0814)
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average -0.0027*** (0.0001) -0.00251*** (0.0002) -0.00284*** (0.0001)
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: All estimates are from linear models and uses the sample weights provided by the BRFSS.
Columns 2, 3, and 4 present the estimates for the female sub-sample of full sample period, housing boom
period, and housing bust period, respectively. See notes of Table 2.2 for others.
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CHAPTER 3 LONG-TERM IMPACT OF MEDICAID EXPANSIONS ON
FINANCIAL OUTCOMES
3.1 Introduction
The fundamental goal of Medicaid expansions is to increase the health insurance cov-
erage of the poor. A large literature examines the effect of these expansions on health
outcomes (Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard, 2015). However, the question of how
these expansions impact financial outcomes has received little attention in the literature.
Recent studies suggest that such impacts may be important. For example, Gross and
Notowidigdo (2011) focus on Medicaid expansions from 1992 to 2004 and find that the
expansions reduce personal bankruptcies. Finkelstein et al. (2012) focus on Medicaid
expansion in Oregon and show that the expansion decreases medical debt. Similarly,
Mazumder and Miller (2014) find the evidence of improvement in credit scores and re-
ductions in delinquencies, personal bankruptcy in the last 24 months, and fraction of
debt past due, in response to the 2006 Massachusetts health care reform.
One limitation of these studies is that they focus only on short time impact. In
this paper, I combine the March Current Population Survey (CPS) with the American
Community Survey (ACS) to examine the long-term impact of the Medicaid expansions
that took place in the 1980s and 1990s on three financial outcomes - homeownership rate,
mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, that have not been
investigated previously. Specifically, I use the 1980-2008 CPS to construct the average
of actual Medicaid eligibility over all ages from 0 to 17 by state of birth, birth cohort,
and race, for the birth cohorts 1980-1991. Next, I use the 2005-2013 ACS to construct
financial outcomes, by state of birth, birth cohort, race, age, and calendar years for these
birth cohorts when they are 22-30 years old. I then match these financial outcomes in
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adulthood with average childhood Medicaid eligibility using state of birth, birth cohort,
and race. The main concern with the use of actual eligibility is that it depends on states
demographic and economic characteristics. To address this concern, I follow Currie and
Gruber (1996) and Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014), and use fixed
simulated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for actual eligibility. To construct this
instrument, I select a fixed (20 %) nationally representative sample from the 1986 CPS
and then assign that same sample to each state. I then use this fixed national sample
to calculate the average of child’s Medicaid eligibility over all ages from 0 to 17 by state
of birth, birth cohort, and race, for the birth cohorts 1980-1991. Since the sample is
national, the fixed simulated Medicaid eligibility depends only on states eligibility rules
and is independent of other characteristics.
The results suggest that Medicaid eligibility during childhood increases homeowner-
ship rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate later in life.
In particular, a one-percentage-point increase in eligibility is associated with a 0.0071
percentage point increase in the homeownership rate, a 0.0088 percentage point increase
in the mortgage ownership rate, and a 0.0024 percentage point increase in the finan-
cial market participation rate. These imply a 2.02 % increase in homeownership rate, a
2.90 % increase in mortgage ownership rate, and a 2.89 % increase in financial market
participation rate, with respect to their mean values. I also show that these results are
not driven by endogenous state Medicaid eligibility expansions. Exploiting only federal
variation, that is arguably exogenous, yields results similar to the main results that use
state variation as well. In addition, main results are robust to the inclusion of state-year
and age-year fixed effects in the model. I also provide the empirical evidence of the
heterogeneity in the effect of Medicaid eligibility across races (whites and nonwhites).
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This paper is related to two strands of literature. By analyzing the long term impact of
Medicaid expansions on various outcomes, this paper is closely related to recent studies by
Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014), D. W. Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie
(2015), and Miller and Wherry (2015). These studies examine educational outcomes,
tax outcomes, and health outcomes, but they do not analyze homeownership, mortgage
ownership, and financial market participation rates. By studying the homeownership
rate, this paper complements research by Engelhardt (2008). A key difference is that this
paper is concerned with the impact of public health insurance expansion on the young
adult homeownership rate, whereas Engelhardt (2008) focuses on the impact of social
security program on elderly homeownership.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents background on Med-
icaid expansions. Section 3.3 reviews the relevant literature, and Section 3.4 provides
an overview of the data. Section 3.5 discusses the identification strategy. Section 3.6
presents the empirical results. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Background on Medicaid Expansions
Medicaid is the largest health insurance program for low-income individuals that
began in 1965. Medicaid for non disabled children was traditionally linked to the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Beginning in the mid-1980s, it expanded,
first by relaxing some of the family structure requirements (under Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984) and then by income requirement: starting in 1986, income requirement was
linked to the federal poverty line rather than to the AFDC limits, and thus, coverage was
extended to families with income above the AFDC limits (Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-
Sheppard, 2015). These expansions are described in Appendix Table C.1.2. Because of
these expansions, by the mid-1990s, most children below the federal poverty line, and
67
all young children below 133% of the federal poverty line, and in certain states, their
parents, were eligible for Medicaid (Gruber and Simon, 2008; Gross and Notowidigdo,
2011). In 1997, Congress augmented Medicaid program for the children with the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). Under the SCHIP, a majority of the
states provided health care coverage to low-income children whose family income level
makes them ineligible for Medicaid but lack private health insurance. For example, under
the SCHIP, children in New York were eligible up to 400% of the federal poverty line.
Because states expanded Medicaid eligibility at different times, and with different levels
of generosity, these Medicaid expansions resulted in a substantial variation in health
insurance eligibility limit by age within states, and also the variation in magnitude of
within state variation across states (Gruber and Simon, 2008; Buchmueller, Ham, and
Shore-Sheppard, 2015).
3.3 Previous Literature
A large number of studies have examined the impacts of Medicaid expansion on various
outcomes, e.g., health insurance coverage, health care utilization, health status, financial
well-being, labor supply, education, and others (Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard,
2015).1 Most of these studies, however, focus on the short-term outcome by examining the
impact of Medicaid exposure on contemporaneous outcomes or outcomes after a few years
(Wherry, Miller, Kaestner, and Meyer, 2015). For example, Gruber and Simon (2008)
exploit cross-state variation in Medicaid expansions from 1992 to 2004 and show that
the expansions reduce personal bankruptcies. Finkelstein et al. (2012) use randomized
control experiment in Oregon and document that Medicaid expansion to low-income
and uninsured adult population increase health care utilization, decrease out-of-pocket
1Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard (2015) provide a comprehensive review of these.
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medical expenditures and medical debt (including fewer bills sent to collection), and
improve self-reported physical and mental health. In a related study, Mazumder and
Miller (2014) examine the impact of 2006 Massachusetts health care reform on a broad
set of financial outcomes for those who were uninsured before the reforms.2 They find
the improvement in credit scores and reductions in delinquencies, personal bankruptcy
in the last 24 months, and fraction of debt past due, in response to the health reform.
Recent studies, however, begin to focus on the long-term outcome by examining the
impact of Medicaid exposure when young on later life outcomes. For examples, Cohodes,
Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014) find that Medicaid exposure when young de-
creases high school dropout and increases college attendance and college completion.
Similarly, Miller and Wherry (2015) provide evidence that Medicaid eligibility in child-
hood results in fewer hospitalizations and emergency department visits in adulthood (age
25) for blacks. Moreover, D. W. Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie (2015) show that children
exposed to Medicaid pay more in cumulative taxes by age 28, collect less money from the
government in the form of Earned Income Tax Credit, and experience decreases in mor-
tality and increases in college attendance. One advantage associated with these studies
is that they potentially address concern of legislative endogeneity relative to studies that
focus on contemporaneous outcomes (D. W. Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie, 2015).
Despite these studies, the evidence of Medicaid eligibility on long-term financial
outcomes remains limited. Gruber and Simon (2008), Finkelstein et al. (2012), and
Mazumder and Miller (2014) focus only on short-term financial outcomes. Using the
census data, I focus on following long-term financial outcomes that have not yet been
examined in the literature: home ownership, mortgage ownership, and financial market
2Mazumder and Miller (2014) focus on entire population of uninsured residents. In contrast, Finkelstein
et al. (2012) focus on only low-income and uninsured adult population, while Gross and Notowidigdo
(2011) focus on low-income pregnant and children.
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participation.
3.4 Data
This paper uses two datasets: the March Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
American Community Survey (ACS). I use the CPS to construct Medicaid eligibility, the
main explanatory variable of interest, and the ACS to construct financial outcome vari-
ables: home ownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation
rate.
3.4.1 March Current Population Survey
I use the March Current Population Survey to construct Medicaid eligibility for the
birth cohorts 1980-1991 that are between the ages of 0-17. 3 In particular, I follow
Currie and Gruber (1996), Gruber and Simon (2008), and Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner,
and Lovenheim (2014) to construct two measures of Medicaid eligibility: actual eligibility
and fixed simulated eligibility. Actual eligibility is defined as the fraction of children of
age a and race r that are eligible for Medicaid in state s and calendar year t based on
family income and demographics (marital status, gender of household head, number of
children, ages of children).4For example, I calculate the fraction of nonwhite aged 1 that
are eligible in Michigan in year 1980, in Michigan in year 1981, and so on for every state
and every year between 1980 and 2008.
The major concern with actual eligibility is that it depends on state’s economic and
demographic characteristics. For example, if the state had the highest fraction eligible
of any state, it might reflect both the generosity of the state’s program and the relative
3I select 1991 as the youngest cohort because data on outcomes (see section 3.4.2) are available for this
cohort at age 22. Similar to Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014), I select 1980 as the
oldest cohort since Medicaid eligibility was very low before 1980.
4I define group cells by race (nonwhite and white) , in addition to state, year, and age, because nonwhite
children are more likely to affected by Medicaid expansions. See section 3.5.
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poverty of its residents. To address this concern, I follow Currie and Gruber (1996) and
use fixed simulated eligibility as an instrument for actual eligibility. This instrument
depends only on the state’s legislative rules and is independent of its demographic char-
acteristics. To construct this instrument, I use a 20% national sample from the 1986
CPS and then assign that same sample to each state . I then use this fixed national
sample to calculate the fraction of children of age a and race r that would be eligible for
Medicaid in state s and calendar year t based on family income and demographics.5. For
example, I take a nationally representative sample of nonwhite aged 1 and calculate the
proportion that would be eligible for Medicaid if they lived in Michigan in year 1980 (with
inflation adjustments 6), in Michigan in year 1981 (with inflation adjustments), and so on
for every state and every year between 1980 and 2008. The use of fixed national sample
assures that the fraction eligible in this sample depends only on state eligibility rules,
and is independent of other characteristics of states.7As described by Currie and Gruber
(1994, 1996), this instrument provides a convenient parameterization of the generosity
of Medicaid laws for each race-age-state-year cell. Next, following Cohodes, Grossman,
Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014)8, I calculate mean of child’s actual eligibility and fixed
simulated eligibility over all ages from 0 to 17 by state-of-birth, birth cohort, and race as
below:
ActualEligscr =
1
18
17∑
i=0
ActualEligscri (3.1)
SimulatedEligscr =
1
18
17∑
i=0
SimulatedEligscri (3.2)
5This national sample consists of 1,592,373 (31223 times 51 states) observations and remains the same
for years 1980-2008. The income variable is deflated (inflated) to years 1980-2008 (from the year 1986)
for which eligibility is calculated using Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
6Inflation adjustment is needed because I am using the 1986 CPS sample. For example, when computing
the eligibility for 1980, income variable is deflated, but when calculating the eligibility for 1987, income
variable is inflated. I use CPI-U from the BLS for the purpose of inflation adjustment.
7See Currie and Gruber (1994) for details.
8I thank Michael F. Lovenheim for helping me understand this measure.
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Here, s is state, c is birth cohort , r is race, t is calendar year, and i is age.ActualEligscri
is the average actual eligibility, and ActualEligscri is the average fixed simulated eligibil-
ity for each state-birth year-race-age cell. ActualEligscr is the main explanatory variable
of interest and SimulatedEligscr is the instrument for the main explanatory variable.
9
Figure 3.1 shows the value of the instrument, SimulatedEligscr, by state. Panel A
presents the value for the oldest cohort (1980 birth cohort) and panel B presents the
value for the youngest cohort (1991 birth cohort). As demonstrated in the panel A, fixed
simulated Medicaid eligibility varies considerably across states within the 1980 birth
cohort, with Alabama having a value of 0.1125 (or 11.25% 10) and Hawaii having a
value of 0.2125 (21.25%). The panel B also demonstrates the substantial variation across
states within the 1991 birth cohort, with Vermont having a value of 0.4227 (42.27%) and
California having a value of 0.6716 (67.16%).
3.4.2 American Community Survey
I use the 2005-2013 American Community Survey to construct three financial out-
comes: home ownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participa-
tion rate by state of birth (s)11, birth cohort (c), race (r), and survey year (t), for the
birth cohorts 1980-1991 that are between the ages of 22-30 12 in 2005- 2013.13
9A simulated eligibility of 0.30 (or 30%) for the Michigan-1980 birth cohort-nonwhite group indicates
that the national sample of nonwhites born in 1980 in Michigan would be eligible for Medicaid for 30%
of childhood years (birth to age 17), or, for approximately 5.1 years, under Michigan’s Medicaid rules
from 1980 to 1997.
10Higher value indicates relatively more generous Medicaid laws. For example, a simulated value of 40%
means that the Medicaid rules of the state is two times more generous than the rules of another state
with the value of 20%.
11I use state of birth as it is unrelated to Medicaid rules (Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim,
2014).
12I select 30 as the oldest age because that is the last age for which I have the data on all four cohorts
(at age 33 I observe only individuals born in 1980, at age 32 I observe individuals born in 1980 and
1981, at age 31 I observe individuals born in 1980, 1981, and 1982, and at age 30 I observe individuals
born in 1980,1981,1982, and 1983. See Appendix Table C.1.1 for details.
13Similar to Wherry and Meyer (2012), I include only those observations of children born in the U.S.
with residence in the 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
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To construct homeownership rate and mortgage ownership rate, I use the information
on the family’s homeownership status and mortgage status 14 in the ACS. Using this
information, I define homeownership variable as an indicator for whether an individual
owns the housing unit and mortgage ownership variable as an indicator for whether an
individual owns the housing unit with a mortgage or loan.
As to the financial market participation variable, I follow the approach of Cole, Paul-
son, and Shastry (2014) and use the information on investment income in the ACS. In the
ACS, investment income is defined as the ”income from interest, dividends, net rental
income, royalty income, or income from estates and trusts received during the previ-
ous year”. Despite limited information on financial wealth in the ACS, Cole, Paulson,
and Shastry (2014) show that investment income in the ACS serves as a good proxy for
broader financial market participation.
Similar to Cole, Paulson, and Shastry (2014), I define the financial market partici-
pation variable as an indicator for whether an individual reports a nonzero investment
income (positive or negative). 15 I then compute means for these three financial outcomes
by state of birth, birth cohort, race, and ACS survey year, using census weights. This
gives homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation
rate by state of birth, birth cohort, race, and survey year. I also compute mean state-
birth year-race-survey year values for following variables: male, married using census
weights.16Next, I match them onto the main explanatory variable and instrument (see
equations 3.1 and 3.2) by state of birth, birth cohort, and race.
14I restrict the sample to noninstitutional, civilian household heads not living in group quarters. In
addition, all of the socio-demographic characteristic variables are those of the household head.
15Investment income can be negative or positive. Also, households are instructed to report even small
amounts credited to an account Cole, Paulson, and Shastry (2014).
16I use household weight for all financial outcomes.
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3.5 Empirical Model
To examine the impact of increased Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes, I follow
Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014) and estimate regression model of the
following form:
yscart =α + βActualEligscrt + λXscart + γs + ηt + θa + scart (3.3)
Here the unit of observation is a state-of-birth (s)/birth-year (c)/age (a)/race (r)/survey
year (t). The dependent variable y is one of three financial outcome measures (home-
ownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate) . The
key explanatory variable ActualElig is the average actual eligibility (see equation 3.1),
and X is a vector of controls, including percent male, percent married , and an indicator
for whether the observation is for the nonwhite sample or not. I include state of birth,
age, and survey year fixed effects and cluster standard errors at the state-of-birth level.
The state fixed effects account for determinants of financial outcomes that differ across
states but are time-invariant (such as housing supply elasticity). The age fixed effects
account for the possibility that younger individuals may be less likely to own home or
own mortgage or participate in the financial market and the year fixed effects controls
for those that vary uniformly across states over time (such as innovations in mortgage
finance). Variable  represents unobserved shocks.
The parameter of interest is β, which tells us the impact of average Medicaid eligibility
during childhood from birth to age 17 on the financial outcomes at adulthood. This
impact is identified using variation in actual Medicaid eligibility within state across birth
cohorts over time (Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim, 2014). This variation
comes from differences in state’s Medicaid eligibility rules as well as differences in its
demographic and economic characteristics.
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The OLS estimate from equation 3.3 will likely to be biased toward demonstrating
adverse impacts of Medicaid on outcomes because unobservable factors affecting eligibility
are likely to be correlated with unobservable factors affecting financial outcomes. In
addition, it is not possible to control all demographic and economic factors that determine
both eligibility and financial outcomes. The inclusion of state and year fixed effects
cannot address this concern if these factors are not constant within a state or across
states within a year. To overcome this problem, I follow Currie and Gruber (1996) and
use fixed simulated eligibility as an instrument for actual eligibility. As described in the
previous section, this instrument is constructed using a fixed national random sample
and so it isolates variation based on state’s Medicaid eligibility rules that is purged of
variation in its demographic and economic characteristics. Specifically, I estimate the
first stage equation of the following form:
ActualEligscart =α + δSimulatedEligscrt + λXscart + γs + ηt + θa + νscart (3.4)
The coefficient and t statistic on the fixed simulated eligibility are 0.89 and 12.16,
respectively (see Appendix Table C.2.1 for the first-stage estimates). This suggests that
fixed simulated eligibility is strongly correlated with actual eligibility. In addition, the
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic (2011.80) and the Kleibergen-Paap Rank statistic (17.45,
p <0.001) indicate that the instrument is neither weak nor underidentified.
The one potential problem with the instrument is that it relies on the exogeneity of
state legislation. For example, there could be differential trends in financial outcomes
across cohorts at the state level that are correlated with, but not caused by, fixed simu-
lated eligibility (Currie and Gruber, 1996; Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim,
2014; Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011). Although I cannot incontrovertibly establish the
validity of this assumption, I follow Cohodes, Grossman, Kleiner, and Lovenheim (2014)
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and conduct two robustness checks to assess their validity in the data. First, I include
state × year and age × year in equation 3.3 to capture any omitted time trends in finan-
cial outcomes that vary by age or state and are correlated with fixed simulated eligibility.
Second, I exploit only federal variation that is arguably exogenous since it relies only on
federal rules compared to variation that uses both state and federal rules. 17
To account for the possible heterogeneity in the effect of Medicaid expansions across
races (whites and nonwhites), I include Nonwhite×ActualElig interaction term in equa-
tion 3.3.18 There are at least three reasons why the effect of Medicaid expansions can be
heterogeneous across races. First, nonwhite children are more likely to benefit from the
Medicaid expansions because of their distribution of family income (Wherry and Meyer,
2012). As depicted in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, for every birth cohort from 1980 to 1991,
nonwhites have higher average Medicaid eligibility between the ages of 0-17 than whites.
Numerically, the percent of nonwhites that were eligible for Medicaid between the ages
of 0-17 was 55.08 percent for the birth cohort 1991 and 20.96 percent for the birth cohort
1980. However, the percent of whites that were eligible for Medicaid between the ages
of 0-17 was 38.22 percent for the birth cohort 1991 and 7.55 percent for the birth cohort
1980. Second, existing evidence on long-term health outcomes suggests that Medicaid
eligibility during childhood is more likely to lead to better health outcomes later in life
for nonwhite children than for whites. 19Third, whites and nonwhites also tend to differ
17The construction of actual federal Medicaid eligibility and fixed simulated federal Medicaid eligibility
are similar to actual Medicaid eligibility and fixed simulated federal Medicaid eligibility. The only
difference is that for the federal eligibility, I fix AFDC rules in each state as of 1980 and consider only
federal mandatory Medicaid rules (see Appendix Table C.2.1 for these rules).
18In this case, there will be two endogenous variables: actual eligibility and Nonwhite×ActualElig. As
before, I instrument actual eligibility with simulated eligibilty and following Balli and Sørensen (2013)
, I instrument Nonwhite×ActualElig with Nonwhite× SimulatedElig.
19For example, Wherry, Miller, Kaestner, and Meyer (2015) find that Medicaid eligibility in childhood is
associated with fewer hospitalizations and emergency department visits for blacks at age 25. Wherry
and Meyer (2012) also provide evidence that Medicaid eligibility in childhood results in a significant
decrease in the internal mortality rate for black at ages 15-18.
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in terms of financial outcomes. For example, nonwhites generally have lower homeown-
ership rates than whites. Accordingly, I estimate the following modified form of equation
3.3 :
yscart =α + β1ActualEligscrt + β2Nonwhite× ActualEligscrt + λXscart + γs+
ηt + θa + scart
(3.5)
The coefficient β2 gives the difference in the impact of Medicaid eligibility on the
financial outcome between nonwhites and whites.
3.6 Empirical Results
This section presents results for three financial outcomes. I first present the OLS
relationship between Medicaid expansions and financial outcomes (equation 3.3). I then
report IV estimates of equation 3.3 for these outcomes. Next, I address endogeneity of
state Medicaid expansions and provide results from robustness checks. Finally, I present
OLS and IV estimates of equation 3.4 that allows for the interaction of eligibility and
race.
3.6.1 Main Results
Table 3.2 presents the main results. Panel A of Table 3.2 presents the OLS estimates,
whereas Panel B presents the IV estimates. In panels A and B, columns 2, 3, and 4 pro-
vide estimates for homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market
participation rate, respectively. The OLS estimates suggest that actual Medicaid eligi-
bility has a statistically negative impact on all financial outcomes but significant only
for homeownership rate and mortgage ownership rate. This is presumably because of the
omitted factors. So, in my preferred specification, I instrument actual Medicaid eligibility
with simulated Medicaid eligibility. Columns 2, 3, and 4 in panel B report the IV esti-
mates. Unlike the OLS estimates, the IV estimates are positive but remain statistically
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significant. In addition, the magnitude of an IV coefficient is larger than the OLS for all
outcomes.
The IV estimates suggest that Medicaid eligibility during childhood increases home-
ownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate later
in life. Specifically, a ten percentage point increase in eligibility is associated with a
0.0071 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate, a 0.0088 percentage point
increase in the mortgage ownership rate, and a 0.0024 percentage point increase in the
financial market participation rate. Given the average values of homeownership rate of
35.18 %, mortgage ownership rate of 30.39 %, and financial market participation rate of
8.31 %, these estimates correspond to increases in homeownership rate of 2.02 %, mort-
gage ownership rate of 2.90 %, and financial market participation rate of 2.89 %. These
magnitudes are economically significant. To see this, consider the increase in Medicaid
eligibility between the 1980 and 1991 birth cohorts (Figure 3.2); the eligibility increased
by 32.29 percentage points. Using estimates from columns 2 through 4 (panel B), this
implies that the change would have increased homeownership rate, mortgage ownership
rate, and financial market participation rate by 6.52 percent, 9.35 percent, and 9.33
percent, respectively.
3.6.2 Robustness Checks
The IV estimates in panel B of Table 3.2 assumes the exogeneity of the instrument.
To test the validity of this assumption, I conduct two robustness checks as described in
3.5. First, I include state by year and age by year fixed effects in the models. Table
3.3 presents the results of this test. Panel A shows that such fixed effects have little
effect on the OLS estimates. Panel B shows that the IV estimates are still positive and
statistically significant; however, these estimates are substantially larger that the baseline
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IV estimates (panel B of Table 3.2).
An alternative test for the concern regarding the endogeneity of the instrument is
presented in Table 3.4 that uses only federal variation. The results are similar to the
baseline IV estimates (panel B of Table 3.2); the point estimates are slightly higher than
the baseline IV estimates. For example, the baseline IV estimate for homeownership
rate (column 2 of panel B of Table 3.2) implies that using all Medicaid variation, a ten
percentage point rise in eligibility is associated with a 0.0071 percentage point (2.02%)
increase in the homeownership rate. However, the IV estimate in column 2 of Table
3.4 suggests that using only federal Medicaid variation, the increase is 0.014 percentage
points (3.98%).
3.6.3 Extension: Race Interactions
Table 3.5 presents the OLS and IV estimates from equation 3.5. As before, columns 2
through 4 of panel A and panel B provide OLS and IV estimates for homeownership rate,
mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, respectively. Both the
OLS and IV estimates show that the interaction term between Medicaid eligibility and
nonwhites is positive and statistically significant for all financial outcomes. This implies
that nonwhites are more responsive to Medicaid expansions than whites as to financial
outcomes. One way to get a sense of the magnitude of the interaction effect is to examine
the partial derivative with respect to Medicaid eligibility using estimates from columns
2, 3, and 4 (panel B):
∂Ownscart
∂ActualEligscrt
= −0.0313 + 0.2462Nonwhite
∂Mortgagescart
∂ActualEligscrt
= −0.0158 + 0.2498Nonwhite
∂Finscart
∂ActualEligscrt
= −0.0098 + 0.0806Nonwhite
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These partial derivatives suggest that the increase in eligibility leads to increases in
homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate for
nonwhites, but decreases in homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial
market participation rate for whites. Specifically, for nonwhites, a ten percentage point
higher eligibility increases the homeownership rate by 0.022 percentage point (6.25 %),
mortgage ownership rate by 0.023 percentage point (7.57 %), and financial market par-
ticipation rate by 0.007 percentage points (8.42 %). For whites, a ten percentage point
increase in eligibility is associated with a decrease in the homeownership rate by 0.0031
percentage point (0.88 %) , mortgage ownership rate by 0.0016 percentage point (0.53
%), and financial market participation rate by 0.001 percentage points (1.20 %). Table
3.6 shows that the interaction effect is robust to the inclusion of state by year and age
by year fixed effects in the models.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides the evidence on the long term impact of Medicaid expansions
that took place in the 1980’s and 1990’s on three financial outcomes - homeownership
rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate. Using the sim-
ulated eligibility instrumental variables approach, I find that Medicaid eligibility during
childhood increases homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market
participation rate later in life. Specifically, a ten percentage point increase in eligibility is
associated with a 0.0071 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate, a 0.0088
percentage point increase in the mortgage ownership rate, and a 0.0024 percentage point
increase in the financial market participation rate. These magnitudes are economically
significant. The estimates indicate that the increase in Medicaid eligibility by the mag-
nitude similar to the increase between the 1980 and 1991 birth cohorts would increase
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homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate
by 6.52 percent, 9.35 percent, and 9.33 percent, respectively. This finding is robust to
only use of variation provided by federal Medicaid expansions.
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Figure 3.1: Average Fixed Simulated Medicaid Eligibility for the Birth-Cohorts
1980 and 1991
Notes: Figure shows fixed simulated Medicaid eligibility, constructed using fixed national sample from
the 1986 March Current Population Survey, for the birth cohorts 1980 and 1991 by state. Medicaid
eligibility is defined as the average Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17. See text
for details.
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Figure 3.2: Average Medicaid Eligibility by Birth-Cohorts
Notes: Figure shows Medicaid eligibility by birth-cohorts and race using the March Current Population
Survey (CPS) data from 1980-2009. Medicaid eligibility is defined as the average Medicaid eligibility
during childhood from birth to age 17. Actual eligibility uses both state variation and federal variation,
whereas federal eligibility uses only federal variation. Simulated eligibility and simulated federal eligibility
use 20% national sample from the 1986 CPS. See text for details.
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Figure 3.3a: Average Medicaid Eligibility by Birth-Cohorts for Whites
Figure 3.3b: Average Medicaid Eligibility by Birth-Cohorts for Non-whites
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
All White Nonwhite
Homeownership rate 0.3518 0.3956 0.2017
(0.1545) (0.1393) (0.1002)
Mortgage ownership rate 0.3039 0.3456 0.1610
(0.1465) (0.1326) (0.0913)
Financial market participation rate 0.0831 0.0955 0.0405
(0.0437 (0.0358) (0.0413)
Age 25.8652 25.8821 25.8074
(2.3882) (2.3817) (2.4103)
Male 0.4567 0.4864 0.3549
(0.0812) (0.0491) (0.0868)
White 0.7739 1.0000 0.0000
(0.4184) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Black 0.1360 0.0000 0.6012
(0.2820) (0.0000) (0.2682)
Other race 0.0902 0.0000 0.3988
(0.2100) (0.0000) (0.2682)
Married 0.3572 0.397 0.2212
(0.1376) (0.1205) (0.1009)
Eligibility age 0-17 0.1997 0.1651 0.3178
(0.1275) (0.1056) (0.1250)
Fixed simulated eligibility age 0-17 0.238 0.2022 0.3607
(0.1362) (0.1157) (0.1296)
Federal eligibility age 0-17 0.0742 0.0589 0.1266
(0.0932) (0.0680) (0.1381)
Federal fixed simulated eligibility age 0-17 0.0769 0.0612 0.1305
(0.0900) (0.0640) (0.1344)
Observations 6638 3366 3272
Notes: Eligibility is defined as the average Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17.
Eligibility uses both state variation and federal variation, whereas federal eligibility uses only federal
variation. See text for details.
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Table 3.2: Effect of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes
Homeownership Mortgage Financial market
rate ownership rate participation rate
(2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Eligibility -0.0620** -0.0397* -0.0012
(0.0262) (0.0216) (0.0130)
Panel B: IV estimates
Eligibility 0.0712* 0.0883** 0.0238*
(0.0404) (0.0331) (0.0128)
Notes: N=6638. Table shows estimates of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes in adult-
hood (aged 22-30 years) (Equation 3.3). Columns 2 through 4 report estimates for homeownership rate,
mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, respectively. Panel A presents the
OLS estimates, and panel B presents the IV estimates. Childhood Medicaid eligibility is defined as the
average actual Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17. All specifications include state
fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects, percent of each state-of-birth, birth cohort, and race
cell who are male and married as well as an indicator for the cell being non-white or not. The instru-
mental variables specifications use the average fixed simulated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for
the average actual Medicaid eligibility in the first stage. Standard errors clustered at the state-of-birth
level are in parentheses. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical
significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
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Table 3.3: Effect of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes: in-
cluding state-year and age-year fixed effects
Homeownership Mortgage Financial market
rate ownership rate participation rate
(2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Eligibility -0.0942** -0.0704** -0.0075
(0.0363) (0.0328) (0.0158)
Panel B: IV estimates
Eligibility 0.1819* 0.1757** 0.0770***
(0.0973) (0.0861) (0.0233)
Notes: N=6638. Table shows estimates of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes in adult-
hood (aged 22-30 years) (Equation 3.3). Columns 2 through 4 report estimates for homeownership rate,
mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, respectively. Panel A presents the
OLS estimates, and panel B presents the IV estimates. Childhood Medicaid eligibility is defined as the
average actual Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17. All specifications include state
fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects, state-year fixed effects, age-year fixed effects, percent
of each state-of-birth, birth cohort, and race cell who are male and married as well as an indicator for
the cell being non-white or not. The instrumental variables specifications use the average fixed simu-
lated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for the average actual Medicaid eligibility in the first stage.
Standard errors clustered at the state-of-birth level are in parentheses. See text for details.Superscripted
notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test.
***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Effect of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes: using
fixed simulated federal eligibility as an instrument
Homeownership Mortgage Financial market
rate ownership rate participation rate
(2) (3) (4)
Eligibility 0.1420*** 0.1416*** 0.0713***
(0.0406) (0.0362) (0.0226)
Notes: N=6638. Table shows the IV estimates of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes in
adulthood (aged 22-30 years) (Equation 3.3). Columns 2 through 4 report estimates for homeownership
rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, respectively. Childhood Medicaid
eligibility is defined as the average actual Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17. All
specifications include state fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects, percent of each state-of-birth,
birth cohort, and race cell who are male and married as well as an indicator for the cell being non-white or
not. The instrumental variables specifications use the average fixed simulated federal Medicaid eligibility
as an instrument for the average actual Medicaid eligibility in the first stage. Standard errors clustered
at the state-of-birth level are in parentheses. See text for details .Superscripted notations next to the
coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance
at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
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Table 3.5: Effect of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes: in-
cluding race interactions
Homeownership Mortgage Financial market
rate ownership rate participation rate
(2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Eligibility -0.1627*** -0.1363*** -0.0317***
(0.0292) (0.0242) (0.0103)
Nonwhite × Eligibility 0.2113*** 0.2025*** 0.0641***
(0.0381) (0.0363) (0.0145)
Nonwhite -0.1235*** -0.1237*** -0.0621***
(0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0078)
Panel B: IV estimates
Eligibility -0.0313 -0.0158 -0.0098
(0.0456) (0.0401) (0.0143)
Nonwhite × Eligibility 0.2462*** 0.2498*** 0.0806***
(0.0446) (0.0429) (0.0137)
Nonwhite -0.1528*** -0.1560*** -0.0707***
(0.0275) (0.026) (0.0075)
Notes: N=6638. Table shows estimates of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes in adult-
hood (aged 22-30 years) (equation 3.5). Columns 2 through 4 report estimates for homeownership rate,
mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, respectively. Panel A presents the
OLS estimates, and panel B presents the IV estimates. Childhood Medicaid eligibility is defined as the
average actual Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17. All specifications include state
fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects, percent of each state-of-birth, birth cohort, and race
cell who are male and married. The instrumental variables specifications use the average fixed simulated
Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for the average actual Medicaid eligibility and Nonwhite average
fixed simulated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for the Nonwhite average actual Medicaid eligibility
in the first stage. Standard errors clustered at the state-of-birth level are in parentheses. See text for
details. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from
a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Effect of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes: in-
cluding race interactions and state-year and age-year fixed effects
Homeownership Mortgage Financial market
rate ownership rate participation rate
(2) (3) (4)
Panel A: OLS estimates
Eligibility -0.2240*** -0.1954*** -0.0439***
(0.0492) (0.0463) (0.0117)
Nonwhite × Eligibility 0.2304*** 0.2220*** 0.0645***
(0.0381) (0.0366) (0.0143)
Nonwhite -0.1212*** -0.1226*** -0.0606***
(0.0217) (0.0205) (0.0081)
Panel B: IV estimates
Eligibility -0.0083 -0.0206 0.0210
(0.1148) (0.1122) (0.0264)
Nonwhite × Eligibility 0.2532*** 0.2614*** 0.0745***
(0.0451) (0.0448) (0.0131)
Nonwhite -0.1573*** -0.1594*** -0.0726***
(0.0299) (0.0274) (0.0080)
Notes: N=6638. Table shows estimates of childhood Medicaid eligibility on financial outcomes in adult-
hood (aged 22-30 years) (equation 3.5). Columns 2 through 4 report estimates for homeownership rate,
mortgage ownership rate, and financial market participation rate, respectively. Panel A presents the
OLS estimates, and panel B presents the IV estimates. Childhood Medicaid eligibility is defined as the
average actual Medicaid eligibility during childhood from birth to age 17. All specifications include state
fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects, state-year fixed effects, age-year fixed effects, percent of
each state-of-birth, birth cohort, and race cell who are male and married. The instrumental variables
specifications use the average fixed simulated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for the average actual
Medicaid eligibility and Nonwhite average fixed simulated Medicaid eligibility as an instrument for the
Nonwhite × average actual Medicaid eligibility in the first stage. Standard errors clustered at the state-
of-birth level are in parentheses. See text for details. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients
indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % ,
5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 CES sample choice and definition of healthcare spending
In the CES, annual healthcare spending for each household do not correspond exactly
with the calendar year for two important reasons.1 First, households in each quarterly in-
terview report the healthcare spending for the previous three months. More importantly,
each quarterly interview is uniformly spread over the months of the quarter. So, the two
households interviewed at the two different months of the same quarter, would report the
healthcare spending for the different prior three months. Second, the CES is a rotating
panel survey with households in each quarterly interview consisting of both new and old
households. Each quarter, one-fifth of the household interviewed is new and replaces the
old households who have finished the fifth interview in the previous quarter. Because of
the rotating nature of the CES, a number of households do not finish all five interviews.
I address these problems in two ways. First, I focus only on the households who
completed all five interviews and reported valid income data. Second, I construct ap-
proximate annual spending for calendar year t2 by including only those households that
entered the survey between the second quarter of calendar year t and second quarter of
calendar year t+1 (Johnson and Li, 2009; Attanasio and Weber, 1995). For example,
to construct healthcare spending for year 2010, I include only households that entered
the survey between the second quarter of 2010 and second quarter of 2011. Thus, year
2010 includes the data that spans from the third quarter of 2010 to the second quarter of
2012.3 In order to compute the annual healthcare spending at the household level, each
1Household health care expenditures include only out-of-pocket spending and do not include those items
that are covered by health insurance (Attanasio and Weber, 1995).
2The calendar year t refers to the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) survey year. The SCF is conducted
every three years and is available from the start of 1983 to 2010.
3The objective is to include only the households that have at least two quarters of the calendar year
expenditures data. Note that the first interview doesnt collect information on expenditures (Johnson
and Li, 2009).
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household is first matched across the quarters by consumer unit identifying variable. The
annual healthcare spending for each household is then obtained as the sum of its previ-
ous quarter (PQ) and current quarter (CQ) variables.4 Household healthcare spending
in the Interview Survey consist of four components5: health insurance, medical services,
prescription drugs, and medical supplies (Foster and Kreisler, 2011).6
(a) Health insurance includes premiums paid by consumers for private health insurance
and Medicare. Private insurance includes coverage obtained individually or through
a group plan sponsored by an employer or other organization.7 Medicare outlays
are premiums paid for Medicare Part B and Medicare Part D coverage. Medicare
Part B (Medical Insurance) helps cover physicians services and outpatient care and
Medicare Part D covers prescription drugs.
(b) Medical services include physicians, dental, eye care, and other professional services;
inpatient hospital care; lab tests and x-rays; other medical care services, such as
hospital outpatient and emergency room care; and nursing home care.
(c) The prescription drug spending category is for outlays that are not connected to
inpatient hospitalization.
(d) Medical supplies include the purchase of hearing aids, eyeglasses and contact lenses,
and the purchase or rental of medical equipment for general use.
The data on healthcare spending (and its components), demographic variables ,and
employment and income are obtained from FMLY file.8 The health insurance variable is
4If household was interviewed in June, then PQ variable refers to the expenditures of March of previous
quarter, and CQ refers to the expenditures of April and May of current quarter. See pps.24, 73, and 77
of Interview users documentation.
5The study does not include health care expenditures collected in the Diary Survey which consists of
nonprescription drugs, nonprescription vitamins, topical and dressings, and medical equipment.
6CES provides components of healthcare expenditures only from the year 1994. For years prior to 1994,
CES gives only total healthcare expenditures.
7The CES does not include the premiums paid by the employers on behalf of households (Gruber and
Levy, 2009).
8I use measure of final income before taxes. For the CES, I use the imputed income data for 2004 Q1 to
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obtained by merging IHB file (for private insurance) and IHC file (for public insurance)
of detailed spending files with FMLY file . The health insurance and medical service
components of health spending are expressed in terms of 2010 dollars using the medical
care services component of Medical care group of CPI-U of the BLS whereas prescription
drug and medical supplies components are expressed in terms of 2010 dollars using the
medical care commodities component of Medical care group of CPI-U of the BLS. The
healthcare spending is then obtained as the sum of these converted components.9
2005 Q4 and non-imputed income data for other years. The annual income in CES is obtained as the
average of the annual income reported in interviews two to five. The demographic variables pertain to
the third interview (these don’t change for most of households across the four interviews).
9For years prior to 1994, I use total healthcare spending in the CES and convert it into 2010 dollar terms
using all items of CPI-U of the BLS.
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A.2 Robustness check: net wealth instead of gross wealth
Table A.2.1: ML estimation of the dependent double-hurdle model using net
wealth specification
Dependent Variable: log(healthcare spending)
Participation equation Consumption equation
Age 36-49 0.2401*** (0.0285) 0.2190*** (0.0218)
Age 50-64 0.4823*** (0.0353) 0.4936*** (0.0249)
Married 0.3341*** (0.0358) 0.2692*** (0.0276)
High School 0.2312*** (0.0375) 0.1693*** (0.0324)
Some college or more 0.4087*** (0.0381) 0.2288*** (0.0324)
African American -0.3273*** (0.0368) -0.1903*** (0.0334)
Other race -0.2021*** (0.0569) -0.0727* (0.0440)
Household size 2 0.1604*** (0.0381) 0.1936*** (0.0313)
Household size 3 0.1428*** (0.0446) 0.2431*** (0.0352)
Household size 4 0.1627*** (0.0438) 0.2550*** (0.0350)
Manager and professional 0.3465*** (0.0400) -0.0705** (0.0290)
Administrative 0.2534*** (0.0396) -0.1109*** (0.0296)
Service 0.1406*** (0.0428) -0.2104*** (0.0359)
Operators 0.1792*** (0.0455) -0.2722*** (0.0351)
Other 0.1148** (0.0510) -0.1672*** (0.0388)
Insured 0.2860*** (0.0252) 0.0561*** (0.0182)
Year 1992 -0.1479*** (0.0575) 0.0660* (0.0390)
Year 1995 -0.1963*** (0.0604) 0.3327*** (0.0408)
Year 1998 -0.0869 (0.0550) 0.3054*** (0.0349)
Year 2001 -0.1310** (0.0530) 0.3196*** (0.0341)
Year 2004 -0.2232*** (0.0560) 0.2830*** (0.0379)
Year 2007 -0.3297*** (0.0526) 0.3386*** (0.0349)
Year 2010 -0.2662*** (0.0516) 0.3191*** (0.0352)
Log of income 0.2182*** (0.0108)
Net financial wealth 0.0008 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0150*** (0.0015)
Other real estate equity 0.0011 (0.0020)
Constant 0.4478*** (0.0651) 4.1568*** (0.1092)
Sigma 1.2566*** (0.0066)
Rho -0.9051*** (0.0067)
Notes: All estimates are from the dependent double-hurdle model using net wealth specification
for pooled sample (1989-2010). Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates for the participation equa-
tion and consumption equation, respectively .The components of net wealth are transformed using
sign(net wealth) × ln(|net wealth| + 1). The omitted categories for age, education, race, household size
and occupation are age 18-35, less than high school, white, household size 1, and unemployed, respec-
tively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observation varies from 23349 to 23376 depending
on the imputation number. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical
significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table A.2.2: Average elasticities for pooled sample with respect to continuous
variables using net wealth specification
Unconditional level
Income 0.2182*** (0.0120)
Net financial wealth 0.0003 (0.0000)
Home equity 0.0100*** (0.0010)
Other real estate equity 0.0001 (0.0000)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates are from double-hurdle models using
net wealth specification. Since the continuous economic variables appear only in consumption equation,
probability average elasticity is close to zero and therefore, conditional level average elasticity is the same
as the unconditional level average elasticity. Number of observation varies from 23349 to 23376 depending
on the imputation number . Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripted notations
next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote
significance at 1 % , 5%, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables..
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Table A.2.3: Average partial effects for pooled sample with respect to binary
variables using net wealth specification
Probability Conditional level Unconditional level
Age 36-49 0.0309*** (0.0040) 0.2791*** (0.0210) 0.0731*** (0.0050)
Age 50-64 0.0566*** (0.0040) 0.6054*** (0.0230) 0.1452*** (0.0050)
Married 0.0459*** (0.0050) 0.3581*** (0.0270) 0.1006*** (0.0060)
High School 0.0286*** (0.0050) 0.2252*** (0.0340) 0.0631*** (0.0060)
Some college or more 0.0575*** (0.0060) 0.3392*** (0.0330) 0.1124*** (0.0080)
African American -0.0511*** (0.0070) -0.2865*** (0.0330) -0.0991*** (0.0090)
Other race -0.0299*** (0.0110) -0.1295*** (0.0420) -0.0525*** (0.0140)
Household size 2 0.0201*** (0.0050) 0.2329*** (0.0300) 0.0541*** (0.0060)
Household size 3 0.0176*** (0.0050) 0.2777*** (0.0350) 0.0572*** (0.0070)
Household size 4 0.0205*** (0.0050) 0.2952*** (0.0350) 0.0631*** (0.0070)
Manager and professional 0.0420*** (0.0040) 0.0123 (0.0270) 0.0488*** (0.0060)
Administrative 0.0305*** (0.0040) -0.0509* (0.0280) 0.0276*** (0.0060)
Service 0.0171*** (0.0050) -0.1767*** (0.0370) -0.0047 (0.0070)
Operators 0.0215*** (0.0050) -0.2300*** (0.0330) -0.0073 (0.0060)
Other 0.0141** (0.0060) -0.1394*** (0.0370) -0.0030 (0.0080)
Insured 0.0398*** (0.0040) 0.1327*** (0.0170) 0.0637*** (0.0050)
Notes: Average partial effects (APE) based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using net wealth
specification for pooled sample (1989-2010). Probability APE indicates absolute change in participation
probability, conditional level and unconditional level APE indicates relative change in healthcare expen-
ditures. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observation varies from 23349 to
23376 depending on the imputation number . Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Super-
scripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed
t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of
variables.
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Table A.2.4: Average elasticities by SCF survey years with respect to economic
variables using net wealth specification
Unconditional level
Panel A: 1989 (No. of observations : 2254-2261)
Income 0.1961*** (0.0410)
Net financial wealth -0.0011 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0145*** (0.0040)
Other real estate equity 0.0009 (0.0010)
Panel B: 1992 (No. of observations : 2147-2159)
Income 0.2288*** (0.0460)
Net financial wealth 0.0009 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0123*** (0.0030)
Other real estate equity -0.0001 (0.0010)
Panel C: 1995 (No. of observations : 1803-1812)
Income 0.0994** (0.0420)
Net financial wealth -0.0002 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0129*** (0.0040)
Other real estate equity 0.0004 (0.0010)
Panel D: 1998 (No. of observations : 3391-3397)
Income 0.1601*** (0.0280)
Net financial wealth 0.0017 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0086*** (0.0030)
Other real estate equity 0.0005 (0.0010)
Panel E: 2001 (No. of observations : 3955-3975)
Income 0.1736*** (0.0280)
Net financial wealth -0.0001 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0128*** (0.0030)
Other real estate equity 0.0002 (0.0010)
Panel F: 2004 (No. of observations : 2257-2566)
Income 0.2902*** (0.0470)
Net financial wealth -0.0002 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0128*** (0.0040)
Other real estate equity -0.0009 (0.0010)
Panel G: 2007 (No. of observations : 3586-3600)
Income 0.2524*** (0.0300)
Net financial wealth 0.0007 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0172*** (0.0040)
Other real estate equity 0.0002 (0.0010)
Panel H: 2010 (No. of observations : 3633-3637)
Income 0.3078*** (0.0340)
Net financial wealth -0.0005 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0047*** (0.0020)
Other real estate equity -0.0002 (0.0000)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using
net wealth specification for each SCF survey years (1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010)
. Since the continuous economic variables appear only in consumption equation, probability average
elasticity is close to zero and therefore, conditional level average elasticity is the same as the unconditional
level average elasticity. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses . Superscripted notations next
to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote
significance at 1 % , 5%, 10 % level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table A.2.5: Average elasticities for constrained and unconstrained households
with respect to economic variables using net wealth specification
Unconditional level
Panel A: Unconstrained households (No. of observations : 18774-18827)
Income 0.2030*** (0.0120)
Net financial wealth 0.0005 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0096*** (0.0010)
Other real estate equity 0.0001 (0.0000)
Panel B: Constrained households (No. of observations : 4528-4587)
Income 0.2559*** (0.0420)
Net financial wealth 0.0001 (0.0000)
Home equity 0.0079*** (0.0010)
Other real estate equity 0.0004 (0.0000)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using
net wealth specification for unconstrained and constrained households. Since the continuous economic
variables appear only in consumption equation, probability average elasticity is close to zero and therefore,
conditional level average elasticity is the same as the unconditional level average elasticity. Households
are defined as credit-constrained if they were turned down for credit or received less that they applied
for, or were discouraged from applying for credit because they believed that they would be turned down.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate
the level of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5%, 10
% level, respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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Table A.2.6: Average elasticities by age groups with respect to economic vari-
ables using net wealth specification
Unconditional level
Panel A: Age 18-35 (No. of observations :6131-6139)
Income 0.3627*** (0.0400)
Net financial wealth 0.0000 (0.0000)
Home equity 0.0065*** (0.0020)
Other real estate equity 0.0000 (0.0000)
Panel B: Age 36-49 (No. of observations : 9806-9816)
Income 0.1929*** (0.0180)
Net financial wealth -0.0002 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0090*** (0.0020)
Other real estate equity 0.0002 (0.0000)
Panel C: Age 50-64 (No. of observations : 7404-7421)
Income 0.1709*** (0.0180)
Net financial wealth 0.0011 (0.0010)
Home equity 0.0135*** (0.0020)
Other real estate equity 0.0000 (0.0000)
Notes: Unconditional level average elasticity based on the estimates from double-hurdle models using net
wealth specification for Age 18-35, Age 36-49, and Age 50-64. Since the continuous economic variables
appear only in consumption equation, probability average elasticity is close to zero and therefore, con-
ditional level average elasticity is the same as the unconditional level average elasticity. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parentheses. Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level
of statistical significance from a two-tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5%, 10 % level,
respectively. See Table 1.2 for definitions of variables.
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Increase in county unemployment rate by size of housing crash
Figure B.1.1: Increase in county unemployment rate, 2006-2013 by size of
housing crash, 2006-2009
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B.2 Definitions of the variables
Table B.2.1: Definitions of the variables
Variable Definition Source
Health Variables
Log of BMI Natural logarithm of Body Mass Index (BMI) BRFSS
Physical Health
Physical health which takes values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 if
BRFSSrespondent reports physical health as poor, fair, good,
very good, and excellent respectively
Poor Mental Health
Number of days during the previous month for which
BRFSS
respondent reports having poor mental health
Binge Drinking
Number of days for which respondents report having
BRFSSat least one occasion with five (four for women)
drinks in the previous month
Current Smoker
1 if respondents report smoking cigarettes some day;
BRFSS
0 otherwise
Daily Smoker
1 if respondents report smoking every day;
BRFSS
0 otherwise
Physical Activity
1 if the respondent reports participating in any
BRFSSphysical activities or exercises in the previous
month; 0 otherwise
Housing Market Variable
County House Price (in ‘000)
Average of real Zillow House Value Index for
Zillowsingle family residence at the county level
during the three months ending with the survey month
Control Variables
County Unemployment Rate
Average of unemployment rate at the county level
BLS
during the three months ending with the survey month
Log of Dow Jones Industrial Average† Natural log of the monthly mean daily market closing
Dow Jones Industrial Average
High School
1 if respondent has an education of high school or less
BRFSS
than high school; 0 otherwise
Some College
1 if respondent has an education of some college;
BRFSS
0 otherwise
College 1 if respondent is a college graduate; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Age Age of the respondents in years BRFSS
Married 1 if the respondent is married; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Divorced 1 if the respondent is divorced; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Widowed 1 if the respondent is widowed; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Other Marital Status
1 if the respondent is separated or never married;
BRFSS
0 otherwise
Mean Income (in ‘000) Weighted average income (see text for details) BRFSS
White 1 if the respondent is White; 0 otherwise BRFSS
African American 1 if the respondent is Black; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Hispanic 1 if the respondent is Hispanic; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Other Race 1 if the respondent is of other races; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Male 1 if the respondent is male; 0 otherwise BRFSS
Notes: † from measuringworth.com. Summary of observations without non-responses from the 2001-2012
waves of Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
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APPENDIX C
C.1 Birth cohorts by age and ACS year and Medicaid legislation
Table C.1.1: Birth cohorts by age and ACS year
Age ACS year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
22 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
23 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
24 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
25 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
26 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
27 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
28 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
29 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
30 1980 1981 1982 1983
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Table C.1.2: Medicaid legislation
1 Deficit Reduction Act
of 1984 (DEFRA) Required states to provide Medicaid to children up to age
5 born after September 30, 1983, who met Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children (AFDC) financial stan-
dards but not the categorical tests for eligibility.
2 Omnibus Budget
Act of1986 (OBRA 86) Permitted states to cover pregnant women and infants
under age 1 (and, on a phased basis, children up to age
5) meeting a state established income standard as high
as 100 percent of the federal poverty level.
3 Omnibus Budget
Act of 1987 (OBRA 87) Permitted states to cover pregnant women and infants
with family incomes up to 185 percent of federal poverty
level and allowed more rapid phase-in of coverage of chil-
dren aged 1 through 5 with incomes below 100 percent
of poverty. Extended to age 7 (or at the state’s option,
to age 8) the required coverage of children born after
September 30, 1983, who met financial but not categor-
ical eligibility standards.
4 Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act
of 1988 (MCCA) Required states to phase in coverage of pregnant women
and infants under age 1 with incomes under 100 percent
of federal poverty level.
5 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act
of 1989 (OBRA 89) Required states to cover pregnant women and children
up to age 6 born after September 30, 1983, with incomes
under 133 percent of federal poverty level
6 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act
of 1990 (OBRA 90) Required states to cover all children under age 19 born
after September 30, 1983, with family incomes under 100
percent of federal poverty level.
7 Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 (BBA 97) Established the State Children’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram (SCHIP, later referred to as CHIP), allowing states
to cover uninsured children in families with incomes be-
low 200 percent of federal poverty level who were ineli-
gible for Medicaid. .
Source: Congressional Research Service (1993), pp. 35-37 and Buchmueller, Ham, and Shore-Sheppard
(2015).
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C.2 First stage regressions
Table C.2.1: First stage regressions
Baseline S-Y and A-Y Federal eligibility
fixed effects only
(2) (3) (4)
Fixed simulated eligibility 0.8923*** 1.0402***
(0.0734) (0.1303)
Federal fixed simulated eligibility 0.3588***
(0.0349)
R-squared 0.9041 0.9142 0.8661
Cragg-Donald F statistic 2011.8 779.88 451
Kleibergen-Paap rank LM statistic 17.45*** 11.71*** 14.48***
Notes: N=6638. Table shows estimates from first-stage regression of average actual Medicaid eligibility
on the instrument (equation 3.4). Columns 2 and 3 use fixed simulated eligibility as an instrument,
whereas Column 4 uses federal fixed simulated eligibility as an instrument. All specifications include
state fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects, percent of each state-of-birth, birth cohort, and
race cell who are male and married. Column 3 also includes state-year fixed effects and age-year fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered at the state-of-birth level are in parentheses. See text for details.
Superscripted notations next to the coefficients indicate the level of statistical significance from a two-
tailed t-test. ***,**,*denote significance at 1 % , 5 %, 10 % level, respectively.
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My dissertation consists of three essays in health economics. In the first essay, I
use the matched data set constructed from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the
Survey of Consumer Finances for period 1989-2010 to investigate the impacts of housing
and financial wealth on healthcare spending. The results indicate significant housing and
financial wealth effects and relatively large housing wealth effects for the pooled sample.
Results for each survey years of the Survey of Consumer Finances further suggest that
housing wealth effects are significant for all years and relatively large, but financial wealth
effects are insignificant in most cases. Analysis by survey years also reveals the diminished
housing wealth effect following the Great Recession. Moreover, the housing wealth effect
is significant and most pronounced among older aged households and credit-constrained
households. In general, the results are qualitatively similar when I use net wealth measure.
In the second essay, I investigate the relationship between local house prices and health
and health behaviors of the individuals using the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System for 2001-2012, a period that includes both the housing boom and housing bust.
I find evidence of positive relationship for poor mental health and binge drinking but
negative association for physical health for those likely to be homeowners. However,
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among those likely to be renters, I document positive impact of house prices on body
mass index but negative effect on physical health and smoking. The subgroup analysis
also suggests substantial heterogeneity of the health effects across gender. Additionally,
I show an asymmetry in the relationship between house prices and health. For example,
the impact of house prices on binge drinking and physical activity are relatively large
during the housing bust period.
In the third essay, I examine the impacts of the public health insurance eligibility
during childhood on longer-term financial outcomes. Exploiting the variation provided
by the Medicaid expansions that took place in the 1980’s and 1990’s and applying the
simulated eligibility instrumental variables approach, I show that Medicaid eligibility
during childhood increases homeownership rate, mortgage ownership rate, and financial
market participation rate later in life. This finding is robust to only use of variation
provided by federal Medicaid expansions.
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